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Abstract
One of the important consequences to be drawn from the course of the financial 
crisis up to now is the insight that more attention must be paid in the future 
to the factors of liquidity, liquidity management and liquidity protection. That 
holds true for the protection of the stability of an individual bank as it does for 
that of a whole national or even international financial system. The liquidity 
problems of a bank can certainly have a variety of causes. However, as an 
examination of the history of bank insolvencies and financial crises shows, 6 Abstract
an accelerated withdrawal of bank deposits by unsecured customers nearly 
always leads in the end to the collapse of an institution and, as an ultimate 
consequence, to a national or even international banking crisis.
This insight has also brought the deposit insurance institutions in many 
countries around the world to the attention of political, regulatory and 
banking management discussions. The rapid, politically necessary, factually 
often not well founded, guarantee promises made by many governments have 
shown those responsible that in Europe the need for a fundamental revision 
of the present deposit insurance schemes must be urgently addressed. In most 
industrialized countries of the OECD, as well as in a range of other states, 
working groups are studying the necessary revisions and adjustments of the 
relevant institutions to meet the new economic and political conditions. Even 
if solutions of this sort continue to be arranged differently from one country 
to another on the basis of differing regulatory, historical and structural 
circumstances, a consensus is emerging over the important basic questions of 
deposit insurance system design and architecture.
As a result of the worldwide financial crisis most European countries 
massively increased their coverage limits for their national deposit insurance 
schemes in the fall of 2008. Where no deposit insurance existed, it was 
introduced. Existing systems were critically scrutinized. In most countries 
the maximum insurance coverage was raised and the eligible deposit base 
was extended. Some individual states have even promised an unlimited 
deposit protection (in some cases with a time restriction). Under the pressure 
of an increasing number of bank failures these promises were made without 
revising the existing deposit insurance schemes themselves. In the course of 
2009, both the individual European states and the EU itself then set about 
scrutinizing their existing protection schemes and mechanisms and revising 
the existing national deposit insurance schemes
1.
It is accepted throughout the world that well designed deposit insurance is 
an important element in a national safety net for maintaining and extending 
the stability of the financial system. The design and structure, but also the 
implementation, of a deposit insurance scheme (DIS) of this sort throws up 
numerous institutional, procedural and instrumental questions. Such operative 
and strategic issues must be answered against the background of the overall 
national circumstances and in line with the country specific realities of the 
respective financial intermediate system. However, there is a series of topics 
1 For an overview of the current structure of European Deposit Insurance Systems see JRC 
(2008a,b) and/or Schich (2009).7 Abstract
that can be assessed and solved independently of such individual circumstances. 
This is even more the case since the worldwide revision of the deposit 
insurance schemes offers the opportunity to create the conditions for a future 
harmonization of national deposit insurance schemes at least within Europe. An 
assimilation of this sort is, in turn, the basis for future EU-wide or perhaps even 
European depositor protection, which, like any broadly based guarantee, would 
certainly be more efficient than a multitude of national solutions.
This publication intends to make a contribution to the ongoing discussion 
of the complex questions connected with the further development of 
European deposit insurance schemes. Both complementing and extending 
the broad range of theoretical literature available, it focuses on some key 
design questions of modern deposit insurance schemes, on the discussion of 
their basic structural elements and on the appropriate consequences for the 
stakeholders in deposit insurance. We focus on:
the derivation of the most important requirements of a modern European  • 
deposit insurance, and the
discussion of specific organizational aspects and fundamental institutional  • 
requirements as well as of solutions for selected system building blocks.
The first chapter analyzes the institutional framework of deposit insurance 
schemes and its various aspects of cost/benefit considerations. The second 
chapter discusses the fundamentals of modern deposit insurance. The third 
chapter examines selected strategic and instrumental questions concerning the 
organization and implementation of deposit insurance schemes. The fourth 
chapter focuses on some questions related to the international harmonization 
and coordination of the design of deposit insurance schemes. In all sections 
we address some lessons learned from the recent financial turmoil. The 
fifth chapter finally addresses some conclusions and sketches some policy 
implications for designing and implementing a modern deposit insurance 
scheme.8
1  Economics of Deposit Insurance
1.1  Some cost-benefit considerations 
The starting point for all considerations about the design of a deposit insurance 
scheme is the question as to why such a system is needed in the first place, or 
how its economic, social and political value can be assessed.
Banks and other financial institutions accept short-term deposits from their 
customers, which they bundle together and in turn make them available to the 
economy in the form of long-term credit. In doing so, they assume a certain 
average quota of deposit withdrawals within a given time. For this capital 
requirement they allocate liquidity in the context of legal and voluntary cash 
management. Short-term excess liquidity or liquidity demand is invested 
or covered on the interbank market. Through this transformation function, 
however, they expose the depositors to the risk of not being able to withdraw 
their money at short notice if need be, as they were promised. Since, if 
a large number of depositors unexpectedly want to get their deposits back at 
the same time (often called a ‘bank run’), the bank, although by no means 
insolvent, does not have sufficient liquidity at that particular moment to meet 
their needs. In a situation like this, repayments of credit received in interbank 
trading or conversely the extension of short-term loans made to other banks 
is put at risk. In this way, contagion and spill-over effects can spread very 
quickly. In an extreme case they affect the whole of a financial market and 
lead to a financial system crisis
2.
A deposit insurance scheme (DIS) therefore always has two crucial aims to 
fulfill:
the first priority is to prevent a run on an illiquid but not yet insolvent financial  • 
institution since in this way the spread of a crisis in one individual institution 
to the other network partners via the interbank market can be prevented;
and as a second priority it should make good the losses incurred by  • 
depositors caused by an illiquid or insolvent financial institution up to 
a certain amount, since it is assumed that the majority of smaller depositors 
2 A keyword often used in this context is ‘domino effect’.9 Economics of Deposit Insurance
of the bank were hardly themselves able to monitor the risk that they had 
taken by, for example, opening a deposit account.
The first of these aims is directed towards protecting the stability of the system, 
the second towards consumer protection. These two positive effects of deposit 
insurance are, however, balanced by negative aspects of such an insurance system. 
An effect that is called ‘moral hazard’ stands at the centre of a heated discussion 
that has been going on for decades. The starting point is the consideration that 
the managers and shareholders of a bank are principally prepared to take larger 
risks to achieve a bigger profit
3. The depositors, by contrast, primarily look for 
a stable and secure banking partner, since they do not share the bigger profit, but 
just receive the interest agreed, even though they could lose their assets in the 
case of a collapse. They are therefore motivated to monitor the risk behavior of 
the managers and, if necessary, to sanction it by an early withdrawal of deposits 
at risk. If the deposits
4 are protected, however, the necessity and thus also the 
motivation to take disciplinary action against the managers’ high-risk behavior 
reduces. According to the theory, the managers then systematically take higher 
risks, to provide themselves and their shareholders with higher short-term 
profits. This might further boost the instability and thus also the likelihood of 
a collapse of the bank. Therefore a highly-developed deposit insurance scheme 
can even reduce the stability of a deposit insurance system.
This risk-taking behavior is accentuated if, every time there is a financial 
crisis, the state extends the deposit insurance scheme further, as has happened 
in nearly every larger crisis of recent decades. This gives rise to the supposition 
among market participants that the state will always jump in as ‘lender of last 
resort’ and existing explicit protection is overlaid with the assumption of more 
extensive implicit protection guarantees.
There is a multitude of empirical studies that support this set of arguments. 
Deposit insurance safety nets strengthen the tendency of agents to take risks 
3  The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) defines moral hazard as “… the incentive for excessive risk 
taking by banks or those receiving the benefit of (deposit insurance) protection” (FSF (2001)).
4  Throughout the paper the following definitions are used:
•  Deposits: Any deposit as defined in Article 1(1) of Directive 94/19/EC, excluding those 
deposits left out from any repayment by virtue of Article 22.
•  Eligible deposits (or protected or insured): Deposits repayable by the guarantee scheme under 
your national law, before the level of coverage is applied.
•  Covered deposits (or guaranteed or reimbursable or repayable): Deposits obtained from 
eligible deposits when applying the level of coverage provided for in your national legislation. 
•  Level of coverage: Level of protection granted in the event of deposits being unavailable 
under your national law, not applying coinsurance.
See also http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/deposit/an6_en.pdf.10 Economics of Deposit Insurance
and thus increase the vulnerability of the financial system
5. Another critical 
study includes an empirical analysis of 61 countries, which shows how and 
under what circumstances deposit insurance can have an explicitly counter-
productive effect on the stability of the financial system
6. And a more recent 
study
7 shows that the concession of protection guarantees over longer periods 
of time can substantially damage the market discipline of fundamentally 
insolvent banks.
Moral-hazard behavior can also come about on the part of the depositors 
when, for example, they entrust their deposits to institutions that entice them 
with the promise of interests above average rates, without thinking too much 
about the fact that higher returns must bring with them greater risks - relying 
instead on the deposit insurance promised.
It is widely accepted that an incorrectly conceived deposit insurance scheme 
leads to problems of moral hazard. Theory and practice are therefore largely 
in agreement that a strengthening of deposit insurance must go along with an 
improvement in the prudential and supervisory framework
8, which seeks to 
reduce precisely this sort of moral hazard behavior. The sensible way for this 
to happen is primarily by attempting to counteract the adverse incentives (for 
managers and owners of banks to increase their risks
9) that are inherent in 
any deposit insurance scheme. If it is possible to reinforce deposit insurance 
with appropriate accompanying measures in the prudential regulation, it can 
achieve its aim of improving the stability of the system and ultimately even 
lead to a positive effect on economic growth
10.
The key question for the design and implementation of a modern deposit 
insurance scheme is therefore: How can a system of this sort be organized, so 
that the above mentioned positive benefits are achieved while minimizing the 
risk of moral hazard behavior on the part of its stakeholders?
5 Chai/Johnston  (2000).
6 Demirgüç-Kunt/Detragiache  (2001).
7 Demirgüç-Kunt/Serven  (2009).
8 E.g. Prescott (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt/Kane (2002), Garcia (2000a), Blair et al. (2006) and 
Principle 2 “Mitigating moral hazard” of the revised Core Principles (BCBS/IADI (2009)).
9 Bhuyan/Yan  (2007).
10  Cull et al. (2001).11 Economics of Deposit Insurance
1.2  European history of deposit insurance
The idea of providing special protection for investors is not new. It always 
comes up following larger financial crises, in the course of which a large 
number of depositors have lost their savings - usually accompanied by 
more or less acute economic, social and political crises. The first national 
deposit insurance scheme emerged as early as the 1920s in what was then 
Czechoslovakia
11. In the 70s deposit insurance schemes were created in 
Belgium and in Germany, for example, but also in Italy, each with very 
different characteristics
12.
The recommendation on insurance protection in the member states of what 
was then the European Community, issued by the European Commission 
in 1986
13, can be seen as a milestone. It tried to impose somewhat more 
consistent basic conditions for insurance schemes that were already in 
existence. Additionally, it encouraged states that did not yet have appropriate 
deposit insurance to implement a suitable scheme.
Since the recommendations were phrased in a very general way, quite 
different national deposit insurance schemes emerged as a result, whose 
design and structure reflected national economic and political influences. 
Only in 1994, in the form of the Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes, did the creation of the first framework come about that aimed to 
harmonize the deposit insurance schemes in the EU member states. But, 
here too, crucial elements, such as the determination and size of the level 
of coverage, the membership or the modes of financing, were left to the 
individual countries as a self regulatory issue. In the context of the periodic 
review of the guidelines in 2006 a commission stipulated the necessity for 
a modernization and wider-reaching harmonization of the national deposit 
insurance schemes of the member states
14. The financial crisis that broke out 
in summer 2007 and, in particular, reached its high point in fall 2008, exposed 
fundamental weaknesses in the deposit insurance schemes operating at the 
time. In nearly all states, work subsequently began to carry out a fundamental 
renewal of the existing deposit insurance schemes - also as a consequence of 
the state guarantees and rescue measures that became necessary. As early as 
11 Garcia  (2000b).
12  Further details on the history of deposit guarantee schemes in the EU can be found in Cariboni 
et al. (2008).
13  Refer to European Commission (1987).
14  Commission of the European Community (2006).12 Economics of Deposit Insurance
March 2009, the EU presented a comprehensive proposal for the adjustment 
and extension of the Directive 94/19/EU
15.
The financial crisis also caused a range of other supranational institutions 
to concern themselves again and more intensively with questions relating 
to the structure and implementation of national deposit insurance schemes. 
A report by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)
16 from early 2008 stressed 
the necessity of internationally recognized basic principles and conditions 
for the structure of deposit insurance schemes. In summer 2008, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) together with the International 
Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) started with the revised version of 
the so-called ‘Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems’. The 
results of this work - a set of 18 principles in total, which together define the 
target function of a modern deposit insurance scheme - were presented to the 
international community in summer 2009
17. Outside Europe, for a number of 
years the IMF and the World Bank have been posing questions concerning the 
adjustment of deposit insurance schemes to the rapidly changing national and 
international conditions of the financial markets.
1.3  Deposit insurance as an element in the financial safety net
Deposit insurance is always part of a comprehensive system for enhancing 
and ensuring the financial stability of a country. Irrespective of the national 
peculiarities of the financial intermediation systems, such an extensive 
financial system safety net consists of five elements that complement and 
strengthen each other:
15  Refer to Directive 2009/14/EC. For an entire overview on newly adopted coverage limits refer 
to Schich (2008a, 2009).
16 FSF  (2008).
17 BCBS/IADI  (2009).13 Economics of Deposit Insurance
Figure 1: Elements of the financial system safety net
Regulation and supervision •  : The basis for securing the stability of the 
financial system is an efficient regulation and supervision of financial 
intermediaries, which, on the one hand, should prevent the onset of a crisis 
and, on the other, should reduce the effects of the crisis if it does happen. 
Findings from the latest financial crisis show that here in particular the 
significance of bank-specific liquidity regulations and the maximum level 
of deposit insurance coverage must be reconsidered.
Lender of last resort •  : A further finding is that every national financial 
intermediation system needs and possesses an explicit or implicit lender 
of last resort in case of a broader financial system crisis. This can be the 
state, the central bank or both of them together.
Bank insolvency/resolution law •  : As a part of the regulation specific to the 
financial industry these legal provisions regulate the specific conditions 
for the handling of bank failures and insolvencies.
Deposit insurance scheme •  : The actual deposit insurance schemes secure 
clearly defined accounts of specific categories of depositor
18, thereby 
reducing the risk of a bank-run and, as a result, preventing a liquidity crisis 
in the financial system as a result of it.
18  Refer to Directive 94/19/EC and to the appropriate list of exclusions in Annex I. An overview on 
exclusions applied in the EU Member States can be found in Cariboni et al. (2008).14 Economics of Deposit Insurance
Institutionalized decision-making/cooperation and resolution processes •  : 
And last but not least the viability of a safety net in case of crisis also 
depends on efficient communication and cooperation between all network 
elements. This requires appropriately standardized and clearly regulated 
processes that at best are also internationally harmonized.
The deposit insurance scheme complements, supports and strengthens the protective 
functions of the other system elements, just as these complement and support the 
deposit insurance scheme in fulfilling its function. In concrete terms, the DIS 
should fulfill, in the context of this comprehensive system, five key functions:
(1)   Confidence function: Deposit insurance creates, through its existence and 
its credibly communicated mechanisms for dealing with a financial crisis, 
confidence among the depositors of the insured institutions in the stability 
of those institutions and of the whole financial system.
(2)   Protection function: It protects depositors in case of crisis against loss 
of their covered deposits in insured institutions. Indirectly it shelters 
the insured institutions against a run on them, and thus the affiliated 
institutions against instability.
(3)   Security function: Deposit insurance secures covered deposits from the 
grasp of other stakeholders in the bank. By virtue of its authority it asserts 
the entitlements of depositors on the basis of the insured deposits.
(4)   Financing function: It ensures that there is adequate financing of the 
capital base necessary to carry out the protection and security functions 
and for a risk-free administration of an increase in the accumulated fund 
size. It makes available sufficient liquidity to cover the insured deposits 
credibly in the case of a claim.
(5)   Support function: Finally, deposit insurance supports the other financial 
safety net institutions concerned with the task of securing and improving 
the stability of the financial system (for example financial market 
supervision or the central bank).
A safety net can only deliver its protective function if every node fulfills the 
function given to it. In the end, the net is only as strong as its weakest element. 
The explicit guarantees of numerous states that became necessary to protect 
eligible bank deposits show clearly that the present deposit insurance schemes 
were not able to meet the demands put upon them adequately.15
2  Deposit insurance fundamentals
With a deposit insurance institution, as with every insurance, there is an 
underwriter who covers certain risks in respect of the insured party or 
provides certain benefits. In the case of deposit insurance, the insured risk 
consists in a financial institution being unable to pay out the covered deposits 
in certain accounts to its owners because of a lack of liquidity or as a result 
of insolvency. A deposit insurance scheme therefore contains the explicit 
guarantee of an institution (deposit insurance), usually limited as far as the 
sum is concerned, in respect of a precisely-defined category of depositors of 
specific financial institutions (mostly banks or other financial intermediaries 
with deposits from the public) in case of a shortfall in precisely-defined 
deposit classes.
2.1  Aims and requirements of a modern deposit insurance scheme
2.1.1  Aims of deposit insurance
The latest financial crisis has shown that the causality of aim and means of 
deposit insurance in the modern financial intermediation system has reversed. 
If, until now, aspects of depositor insurance were in the foreground, which 
should consequently lead to a strengthening of system stability, today it is 
precisely the reverse: The primary aim of a deposit insurance scheme is 
the strengthening of system stability, which is to be achieved by credible 
depositor protection, among other things
19.
This difference is an important one, even if it might have faint echoes of 
the question about the chicken and the egg. Thereafter, the role profile for 
modern deposit insurance as well as the formulation of its targets shall go 
beyond the pure ‘pay box’ function of paying out covered deposits in the 
case of a claim. A corresponding definition of the aim can be guided by the 
following points:
19  The current formulations in the revision of the EU deposit insurance are similar, where the aims 
are formulated as follows: “1. strengthen depositor confidence, 2. enhance financial stability, 3. 
protect part of depositors’ wealth (…)”. European Commission (2009).16 Deposit insurance fundamentals
Deposit insurance:
prevents the collapse of illiquid but fundamentally solvent financial  • 
institutions through appropriate bridging measures in coordination with 
the financial supervisory institutions and the central bank;
ensures quick and full payout of covered deposits in the case of a claim and  • 
provides the financial market supervisory body with controlled liquidation 
or resolution of financial institutions that have become insolvent or are 
threatened with insolvency; and therefore
increases the stability of the financial intermediation system by means of  • 
a credibly communicated guarantee of short-term customer deposits with 
banks and other system-relevant financial intermediaries.
In all cases, the central aim of deposit insurance is to make a contribution to 
strengthen the financial market stability. This can be achieved by increasing 
the confidence of the depositors, as an important category of creditors, in the 
security of the capital that they have entrusted to the financial intermediary, 
and thus reducing the risk of a bank run. The deposit insurance system 
thereby conceives of itself as an element in a comprehensive safety net of 
financial intermediation.
The discussions about the target function of a deposit insurance scheme 
are strongly shaped by national political and economic conditions. An 
examination of the contributions to discussions in the international, and in 
particular the European context shows that in the conception of a modern 
deposit insurance scheme other aims can certainly also be included:
Competition policy •  : Strengthening of the competitiveness of smaller banks 
relative to larger participants in the market and securing access to the 
market for new competitors.
Consumer protection •  : Protection in the first instance of uninformed 
depositors and investors with insufficient financial literacy.
Growth policy •  : Support for the tendency to save and strengthening of 
the economic growth potential associated with it, as well as support for 
macro-economic stability.17 Deposit insurance fundamentals
Reduction of costs: •   Through the funding of a deposit insurance fund (DIF) 
the follow-up costs for the tax payer from a financial crisis are reduced.
Numerous empirical studies
20 show that a well-conceived deposit insurance 
scheme not only supports the stability of the financial system, but can also 
contribute to achieving all of these aims. Accordingly, the scheme must 
be conceived of as part of a comprehensive safety net for the financial 
sector. Equally clear, however, is the recognition that if deposit insurance is 
inadequately structured it can even be counter-productive and can undermine 
the stability of the financial system.
2.1.2  Requirements of a deposit insurance scheme
In order to achieve the aims attributed to it, a deposit insurance scheme must 
fulfill a set of basic requirements. These include in particular:
Financial stability:  •  The deposit insurance scheme can only fulfill its 
role if it has the necessary financial capacity available to do so. The 
fund’s capital base thereby also fulfills an important function in assessing 
the credibility of the insurance and thus the confidence in the security of 
the eligible deposits.
Fair competition:  •  Contributions made in support of a deposit insurance 
scheme must be organized to offer fair competition. Individual or groups 
of insured institutions must not be disadvantaged.
Originator orientation:  •  Contribution payments are to be organized 
according to the cost-by-cause principle i.e. according to the claim risk 
of the insured institution. Anyone who represents a bigger claim risk for 
the deposit insurance scheme shall pay a higher contribution to the fund. 
Premiums for the insured institutions that are not risk-based do not fulfill 
the requirement of fair competition mentioned above.
Incentive compatibility:  •  The trade-off between the security connected with 
high coverage sums and the reduced market discipline (moral hazard) must 
be prevented by the appropriate design of the deposit insurance scheme.
20  E.g. Demirgüç-Kunt/Detragiache (2001), Demirgüç-Kunt/Kane (2002) and references herein. 18 Deposit insurance fundamentals
Regulation of powers:  •  The deposit insurance scheme needs extensive 
power to ensure the payment of contributions, to stabilize endangered 
financial institutions and to ensure the rapid and complete payout of 
covered deposits.
Simplicity and transparency:  •  Credibility is based on convincing 
communication of the aims and mechanisms of the deposit insurance 
scheme. Simplicity and transparency of the structures and processes are 
the keys to this.
Cost efficiency:  •  Directly connected with the above is the concept of cost 
efficiency. The administration of the fund assets, the management of the 
fund and the handling process must be organized in a cost-efficient way.
Independency:  •  The deposit insurance scheme is to be organized on the 
one hand as an integral element of a national safety net, but on the other 
as independently of the external exertion of influence by stakeholders as 
possible
21.
Responsibility •  : Independence goes along with accountability for capital, 
returns and costs to parliament, the government and the public.
Reasonability •  : Last but not least a deposit insurance scheme has 
indispensably to consider also country-specific conditions. It has to ensure 
that its specific design features are compatible with mainly economic 
circumstances ensuring that deposit insurance is not overpriced
22 so that 
premiums are bearable. 
Essential external conditions for efficient deposit insurance include effective 
regulatory conditions, close supervision of the financial institutions, an 
ongoing assessment of the current risk situation in the financial intermediation 
system and a comprehensive set of regulations for monitoring and dealing 
with illiquid banks or for handling the resolution of insured institutions.
21  See also Garcia (2000a), Kahn/Santos (2002).
22  Garcia (2000a), Laeven (2008), Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2007).19 Deposit insurance fundamentals
2.2 Guarantee  promises
2.2.1  Implicit and explicit guarantees
A guarantee promise for the protection of deposits can take place explicitly or 
implicitly
23. In the case of a formal deposit insurance scheme the guarantee 
promise is always explicit. The guarantee is secured by contract. There 
exists a legally secured and therefore enforceable claim for fulfillment of the 
guarantee promise.
Guarantee promises are often based on governmental declarations (explicit 
guarantee). But they can also only be based on the public assumption 
(implicit guarantee) that in the case of a bank failure the state will cover in 
whole or in part the losses of depositors. These assumptions may be founded 
on the statements of government representatives (for example, the ‘Merkel 
guarantee’ of fall 2008 in Germany) or on past experience of the state, for 
whatever reason, saving illiquid or insolvent financial institutions (so-called 
‘bail out measures’). An examination of the history of financial crises in recent 
years shows that in the end the state (or the tax payers) has always intervened 
when larger financial institutions have got into difficulty. The latest financial 
crisis, too, has proved once again that no government can economically or 
politically afford to let larger financial institutions and a larger number of 
depositors suffer losses.
It is important to recognize that with explicit guarantee systems (for example, 
in the context of a state deposit insurance scheme) implicit guarantee 
promises are also always present. No deposit protection scheme will be in 
a position to defray all covered deposits in the case of a serious crisis in the 
financial system. A lesson from the latest financial crisis is that the public, 
and ultimately the financial institutions too, can work on the basis that in the 
worst case the state will limit the losses to depositors with suitable bail out 
measures. Only if such implicit guarantees are expressly accepted can they 
also be factored in to corresponding risk-based financing models of deposit 
insurance.
23 To see the difference and an appropriate academic literature overview on explicit deposit 
insurance refer to Hoelscher et al. (2006) or Garcia (2000a).20 Deposit insurance fundamentals
2.2.2  Limiting guarantee promises
Guarantee promises in deposit insurance are basically always limited. The 
determination of the appropriate limit is one of the self regulatory issues of 
a national deposit insurance scheme.
In the course of the latest financial crisis a series of governments lifted these 
limits in fall 2008
24 and made unrestricted guarantee promises for certain 
deposits. Such promises in the middle of a dramatically unfolding crisis are 
certainly helpful in stopping an erosion of public confidence in the financial 
sector. They might be politically justifiable, but they are problematic in 
a number of respects. For one thing, the question arises as to if and how a state 
can actually honor the promise in the case of a claim. For another, a large 
number of negative incentives come from promises of this sort - the danger 
of shifting capital into deposits with unlimited protection or a weakening of 
market discipline can be cited as examples. In addition, the question arises as 
to how unlimited promises of this sort can be withdrawn again at a later date 
and what their effect on the public with regard to the behavior of the state in 
future crises will be.
Studies show that the size of the deposit insurance coverage correlates 
negatively with the effect on market discipline
25. The bigger the guarantee 
promise, the smaller will be the motivation of the investors to worry about 
their bank’s exposure to risk. And the greater will also be the incentive for 
bank managers to use this decreasing market discipline to take on additional 
risks and thereby profiting of the additional associated short-term returns 
associated with them
26.
2.3  Depositor and deposit categories
Deposit insurance schemes also generally limit the categories of depositors who 
are eligible to benefit from the guarantee promises. Those exclusively protected 
depositors, be they private individuals, associations of people or small and 
24 An overview can be found in Schich (2008a). According to Directive 2009/14/EC the coverage 
shall be increased to 100,000 EUR per depositor until 31 December 2010 latest. 
25 Demirgüç-Kunt/Huizinga (2004) consider two cross-country samples of banks from 30 to 50 
countries in 1990–1997. They find that explicit deposit insurance lowers banks’ deposit interest 
rates and renders interest rates less sensitive to bank risks. Thus deposit insurance is found to 
reduce the market discipline required by depositors.
26 This behavior, which is supported by numerous empirical studies, is the reason why a lot of 
economists reject an extension of deposit insurance. See here the description in Schich (2008b).21 Deposit insurance fundamentals
medium-sized business, hold investments in financial institutions in the form of 
savings deposits
27. Here, too, in fall 2008 a series of governments considerably 
extended the circle of depositors and deposit categories insured, in order to 
reduce the drain on liquidity in endangered banks. Even the state protection of 
interbank investments was discussed. Here, too, the question arises as to how 
the guarantee promises made could really be honored in the case of a claim
28.
Lessons from the financial crisis
•    In the case of a crisis, explicit and implicit guarantee promises coexist in all states.
•    Governments are rather expeditious to make assurances about extended guarantees. 
The quicker unlimited guarantee promises are made by the state in a crisis, the more 
heavily the stakeholders in the financial system will rely on corresponding bail out 
measures in the next crisis and orientate their behavior accordingly.
•    Deposit insurance schemes that are introduced or revised under the pressure of 
a financial crisis often come along with a greater risk of relaxing market discipline than 
those that are developed and implemented in calmer times
29.
2.4  Political aspects of deposit insurance
Ultimately, the target function of a deposit insurance scheme derives from 
its legally determined mandate. This means, however, that the concrete 
organization of a national deposit insurance scheme is not only determined 
by objective criteria, but is also exposed to a multitude of political influences. 
In every country the legislative and the executive branches find themselves 
exposed to heavy pressure from the financial lobby when it comes to defining 
restrictions on the financial industry. This is also true for the conception and 
implementation of comprehensive and effective deposit insurance.
27  Referred to as ′eligible or insured deposits′. For EU 27, an overview on types/classes of deposits 
excluded from guarantee regarding the list in Annex I to the Directive 94/19/EC can be found in 
JRC (2007).
28  In 2008, for example, Ireland extended its guarantee promises to all deposits in the six biggest 
banks in the country, even though the financing of these investments in the case of a claim was 
an open question. Iceland even had to fall back on credit from the International Monetary Fund to 
fulfill its promises of deposit insurance.
29 See here, for example, the studies of Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2007), Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(2006B) and Hovakimian et al. (2003).22 Deposit insurance fundamentals
Discussions following the latest financial crises show that in practice there are 
four problem areas that need to be considered in this context:
Political influence on the aims •  : Mostly, pressure is applied in the direction of 
a generous design of deposit insurance, with regard both to the type of deposit 
insured and to the level of the guarantee promise. Empirical studies confirm, 
however, that generous solutions encourage moral hazard behavior
30. In 
particular, weak financial institutions and those that have a large appetite for 
risk lobby for an extension of the benefits of the deposit insurance.
Political instrumentalization of the decision-making authorities and/or  • 
the decisions: Here, it is mainly a question of influencing the decisions 
about paying out threatened deposits, or, where they are a part of the 
role of the deposit insurance scheme, the decisions to bail out banks 
threatened with insolvency. Influence can for example be exerted via 
the politically-motivated selection of committee members for deposit 
insurance organizations.
Regulatory capture •  : Not only private, but also public deposit insurance 
schemes attempts to instrumentalize deposit insurance in favor of the 
insured financial industry can come about.
Conflicts between elements in the financial safety net •  : Finally, politics 
regularly also plays a part in the cooperation and coordination of the 
individual elements of the financial safety network of a country. Although 
the ministry of finance, the central bank, regulatory institutions and deposit 
insurance have a common interest in securing and strengthening the 
stability of the financial system, they are partly pursuing other goals too.
Studies have demonstrated the fact that - and the means by which - interest 
groups and the political economy influence the structure and development 
of a whole financial intermediation system, but also its individual elements 
and in particular deposit insurance. The principal/agent problems that emerge 
from this can only be reduced through a clear formulation of the aim of 
deposit insurance within the framework of legal and regulatory provisions, 
the guarantee of the widest possible independence of the institution and its 
committees, a clear allocation of powers, a controlled and open exchange 
of information between all involved institutions in the financial safety net 
and procedures that are as standardized as possible for the ‘normal case’ 
30 Manz (2009), Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2007), Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2006a,b), Gropp/Vesala 
(2004).23 Deposit insurance fundamentals
of a financial crisis restricted to a few institutions or the ‘special case’ of 
a systemic financial crisis.
Lessons from the financial crisis
•    The deposit insurance scheme must primarily be directed at the improvement in 
system stability. Depositor protection is a means to an end in this.
•    A detailed agreement, settled in advance, on the roles and powers of the individual 
elements in the financial safety net is needed.
•    The absence of a detailed manual for dealing with systemic crises can lead to 
conflicts and loss of efficiency between the elements of the financial safety net.24
3  Deposit insurance architecture
3.1 Scheme  structure
As already mentioned, deposit insurance is not just based on an institution 
created for the purpose, but on the efficient collaboration of all institutions 
entrusted with roles in securing the stability of the financial system. Like 
any system, the system of deposit insurance can be understood through its 
elements, the relationships between these elements and the characteristics of 
those elements and relationships. Figure 1 provides an overview of the typical 
system elements found in any DIS.
Figure 2: Basic elements of a national DIS
Insured financial institutions:  •  Refers to the circle of institutions included 
in the deposit insurance or, put negatively, the institutions whose deposits 
are explicitly not insured.
Insured depositors:  •  Legal classification of the depositors who are in 
possession of eligible deposits.
Eligible deposits:  •  Legal classification and factual and/or quantitative 
demarcation of the insured positions or, put negatively, the positions not 
covered by the deposit insurance.
Deposit insurance institution(s):  •  Underwriters as the key element of the 
deposit insurance scheme.25 Deposit insurance architecture
Supervisory system:  •  Supervisory functions that are directly or indirectly 
connected with the deposit insurance. 
Central bank:  •  Mostly takes on specific functions in connection with 
deposit insurance (for example, guarantee functions that act as a form of 
reinsurance).
Government:  •  In any deposit insurance scheme the state has an important 
role, be it as the agency of the deposit insurance institution or as an 
additional explicit or implicit guarantor. In the interests of completeness, 
the guarantee functions of individual state levels/elements present in 
addition to the deposit insurance institution in different countries must be 
included here (liabilities assumed by public bodies, guarantor’s liability, 
to give just a few examples, as still in existence in some states, for 
example Switzerland). Legal and regulatory provisions define the overall 
conditions within which the participants in the system operate and fulfill 
their functions.
These stakeholders in a DIS all have different interests and aims. The design 
of a deposit insurance scheme is therefore always confronted with conflicts 
of aims. Common to all stakeholders is the need for the highest possible level 
of stability in the financial intermediation system. Financial system stability 
has become a public commodity that has a positive (albeit different) value for 
all stakeholders.
3.2  Principles of design
The concrete organization of a deposit insurance scheme will always depend 
on the legal, political, economic and cultural conditions of the country 
concerned. Independently of these national characteristics, however, some 
principles of design that are valid for all modern systems can be derived from 
the experiences of the recent past. As early as 2001, the Financial Stability 
Forum presented a ‘manual’ for the development and implementation of 
a deposit insurance scheme
31. Numerous other practice-oriented publications 
complemented and extended these proposals in subsequent years. In early 
2009 the IADI together with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
presented the ‘Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems’, 
which can serve as a guide for the development and extension of modern 
31 FSF  (2001).26 Deposit insurance architecture
deposit insurance schemes
32. These not only summarize the main results 
of a broad theoretical and practical discussion over recent years, but also 
explicitly include experiences related to deposit insurance from the latest 
financial crisis.
Lessons from the financial crisis
•    A too low level of coverage leads to the complete ineffectiveness of deposit 
insurance. A deposit insurance scheme is either credible without any reservations or 
it is completely ineffective.
•    Independent of the design of a deposit insurance guarantee, any deposit insurance 
scheme requires additional explicit or implicit guarantee promises / implications 
from the state in case of crisis.
•    To have its full effect, a deposit insurance scheme needs a clear aim that must be 
communicated to the public in a comprehensible and credible way.
•    In the case of a crisis the deposit insurance institution must cooperate closely with 
the other institutional elements in the financial safety net, in particular with the bank 
supervisory authorities, the central bank and the government.
3.3  Building blocks of a deposit insurance scheme
Every deposit insurance scheme consists of a number of basic building 
blocks. While these building blocks are almost identical in all solutions, 
their specification naturally takes country specific circumstances into 
consideration. Thus it is possible to describe a modern deposit insurance 
scheme (in extending the building blocks in figure 2) by means of the 
following complementary building blocks:
32 BCBS/IADI  (2009).
33  For an example refer to the Northern Rock experience in 2008. See also Congdon et al. (2009).27 Deposit insurance architecture
Figure 3: Complementary building blocks˝of national deposit insurance 
schemes (DIS)
3.3.1  Aim and remit
The basic aim of a deposit insurance scheme is more or less identical in all 
solutions: Strengthening the stability of the financial system by preventing 
runs on banks (preventive effect) and securing deposits up to a specified 
amount (curative effect). On the basis of the fundamental functions attributed 
to the deposit insurance scheme, it is possible to differentiate four separate 
types of deposit insurance schemes, which differ with regard to their roles and 
powers, and also regarding their fundamental design
34, where the functions of 
the simpler model are always contained in those of the more complex model:
34 LaBrosse/Walker  (2006).28 Deposit insurance architecture
Figure 4: Types of deposit insurance schemes (DIS)
(1)   The ‘pay box’ model: In this model the role of the deposit insurance 
institution is limited to paying out on the covered deposits in favor of 
the eligible deposits. In the case of a claim, the deposit insurance fund 
receives a corresponding instruction (from the bank supervisors, for 
example) and ensures an orderly settlement of all claims.
(2)   The ‘cost reducer’ model: In addition to the settlement function, in this 
model the deposit insurance institution takes on the role of handling any 
occurrence of insolvency in an insured institution with the lowest possible 
costs and externalities for the financial intermediation system. In this 
case, the deposit insurance is granted powers in specific circumstances or 
events to intervene in the insured institution and to arrange preventive or 
corrective measures to protect the covered deposits.
(3)   The ‘resolution facilitator’ model: This model of the powers of deposit 
insurance goes a step further. It allows the deposit insurance institution 
to use its capital not only to settle deposit shortfalls that have occurred, 
but also proactively to support a bank that has got into difficulties (but 
is not yet illiquid or even insolvent). In this model, the deposit insurance 
institution will, for example, help to sell an insured institution to a suitable 
partner, split up individual business areas, or prepare recapitalization in 
order to protect covered deposits.
(4)   The ‘supervisor’ model: This model has the broadest portfolio of powers. 
Here the deposit insurance institution itself becomes part of the supervisory 
system. It exercises direct supervisory functions and has a corresponding 
influence over the financial institutions associated with it.29 Deposit insurance architecture
Lessons from the financial crisis
•    Deposit insurance schemes should be an integrated part of recapitalization strategies 
for illiquid (but not insolvent) insured financial institutions.
•    The mixture of supervisory and insurance functions leads to an increasing need 
for coordination with other public institutions, but not to an enhancement in the 
credibility of the deposit insurance.
•    The ‘resolution facilitator’ model has proved to be a sensible one.
3.3.2 Legal  form
The choice of legal form - which depends, in turn, on the national legal 
circumstances - is a function of the chosen aim and of the degree of 
independence desired for the deposit insurance institution. Literature and 
practice agree that a deposit insurance institution should enjoy an independence 
that is as great as possible both from the financial industry that is insured and 
from other public elements of the financial safety net (supervisory authorities, 
central bank and government)
35. To this end, it requires a legal form in which, 
although the management and governing body are selected by political 
committees, they can take decisions and act independently.
A further determining factor for the legal form (and the governance structure 
connected with it) is the choice of ownership for the deposit insurance fund. 
Essentially, the fund can be conceived of either as a public or private special 
asset
36. Especially in the latter case, a legal form will be chosen that allows 
more extensive rights of co-determination or even ownership rights of the 
insured institutions.
Lessons from the financial crisis
•    Private deposit insurance organizations conceal the danger of ‘regulatory capture’.
•    In case of crisis a non-governmental organization structure can have pro-cyclical 
effects if unsuitably constructed.
35  Hoelscher et al. (2006), Garcia (2000a,b).
36  (Dis)advantages can e.g. be found in Hoelscher et al. (2006) or Garcia (2000a) and references 
therein.30 Deposit insurance architecture
3.3.3 Membership 
Three fundamental questions arise in connection with membership: What 
types of financial institutions should be included in the deposit insurance, 
should membership be voluntary or compulsory, and should large institutions, 
whose covered deposits in the case of a crisis cannot be defrayed by a fund, 
no matter how it is conceived, also be included? The experiences of the recent 
past can be helpful to answer these questions:
Insurance for all types of institutions with deposits and interbank  • 
relationships: Fundamentally, all financial institutions that accept deposits 
from the public and/or might directly or indirectly represent a risk for the 
stability of the financial intermediation system should be included in the 
deposit insurance. A risk of this sort arises primarily through the complex 
financial interdependence of financial institutions through interbank 
business. Among these institutions, irrespective of their legal status, all 
of those financial intermediaries who both accept deposits and carry out 
interbank business are included. Conversely, institutions that do not fulfill 
at least the deposit criteria can be exempted from the obligation to make 
contributions and from the protection of the deposit insurance.
Obligatory membership •  : Opinion is largely united today that membership 
for all financial intermediaries who meet the above criteria must be 
obligatory
37. Voluntary membership leads to adverse selection or increased 
moral hazard behavior
38. In addition, the credibility of the deposit insurance 
at the system level correlates positively to the level of coverage (i.e. fund 
size as well as the implicit or explicit guarantee) in a system of financial 
intermediation: The more complete the insurance cover, the more credible 
the system as a whole appears. This means that financial institutions 
that might have other forms of shortfall guarantees available to them 
are to be incorporated into the deposit insurance scheme. Their specific 
circumstances can be taken into consideration within their risk-based 
contributions to the financing. Arguments about the risk diversification of 
the fund play a subordinate role in this connection - here clear differences 
exist from other forms of insurance, which mean that default risks in the 
deposit insurance fund can hardly be diversified.
37 See Directive 94/19/EC, art. 3, para. 1. Accordingly, academic and practical literature argues 
for further for obligatory membership.
38  Blair et al. (2006), Garcia (2000b).31 Deposit insurance architecture
Inclusion of larger financial institutions •  : There will be financial institutions 
in each country for which in every case the disbursement of all covered 
deposits would go beyond the deposit insurance scheme’s ability to 
pay. As a consequence of the latest financial crisis it seems clear that in 
future crises, too, these institutions will have at their disposal an implicit 
government guarantee of their covered deposits and, if need be, of other 
financial items, indeed that they will even have at their disposal an 
(implicit) guarantee of survival. This insight might be undesirable from 
the point of view of regulation policy and be rejected in this form by 
several politicians, but for the coming years, if not decades, it will be 
regarded by all market participants as the basis of their decision-making 
and behavior
39. 
The contributions of larger financial institutions to the deposit insurance fund 
reduce the potential costs to the tax payer and strengthen the basis of the fund 
to cover shortfalls of other insured institutions. They are to be regarded as pro-
rata compensation for externalities of a comprehensive crisis in the financial 
system, usually triggered by these large institutions. As a consequence of this 
insight it follows that even large financial institutions should be obliged to be 
affiliated to national deposit insurance schemes and have to contribute to its 
financing in accordance with the risk they represent, even if it can be assumed 
that in the case of a crisis it is not the fund, but some other form of public 
support, that will come into effect.
Lessons from the financial crisis
•    Membership of the deposit insurance system must be obligatory for all financial 
institutions with defined characteristics. 
•    This also holds true for large institutions that have additional explicit or implicit state 
guarantees available.
3.3.4  Insured depositors and eligible deposits
If the primary aim of deposit insurance consists in preventing a run on a bank 
or reducing the likelihood of one occurring or in minimizing its effects, then 
considerations motivated by social policy should not primarily be the basis for 
39 An examination of the financial crises of the recent past (for example, from the middle of the 
1990s up to the latest crisis in 2008/2009) shows that, without exception, the state in all affected 
countries has saved or restructured system-relevant financial institutions with appropriate bail-out 
measures.32 Deposit insurance architecture
determining the form of the insurance. Rather, it is a matter of including all of 
those deposit classes in the deposit insurance that in the short term can lead 
directly to liquidity bottlenecks for the bank. On the other hand, all deposits that 
do not have a direct effect on liquidity and thus represent no direct threat to the 
stability of the insured institution and/or the financial system can be excluded.
Those deposits should be insured for which in the case of a crisis a rapid 
withdrawal, and through a risk to liquidity, must be expected. These include 
(in all currencies):
all kind of saving accounts and short term deposits by private and business  • 
customers (excluding financial institutes);
outstanding debts to customers with a short duration of a maximum of  • 
three months.
In the following we refer to the sum of the items described above as the eligible 
deposits (ED). The sum insured within these items up to a defined cap (for 
example 100,000 euro/customer) is referred to as covered deposits (CD). The 
covered deposits (CD) are therefore a subset of the eligible deposits (ED)
40.
Figure 5: Relationship between eligible deposits (ED) and covered deposits (CD)
Source: Based on definitions provided by JRC (2007)
Most national deposit insurance schemes only secure deposits in the 
‘traditional’ form of savings and deposit accounts
41. This solution, motivated 
40  For numerical examples refer to Annex IV of JRC (2007), available under http://ec.europa.eu /
internal_market/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm.
41  For details refer to the country specific (self)regulatory authorities’ web pages.33 Deposit insurance architecture
primarily by social policy, fails to recognize that for endangered financial 
institutions substantial liquidity risks can also come from other short-term 
passive deposits. In addition, experience shows that in situations of uncertainty 
a shift from non-protected forms of investment to protected investments must 
be anticipated.
Lessons from the financial crisis
•    The definition of covered deposits should start from the liquidity exposure of eligible 
deposits on the balance sheet, and not be guided by socio-political motives.
•    Not only private but also business customers can be subject to ‘bank-runs’.
3.3.5  Governance and responsibilities
The latest financial crisis has once again made clear that only the state is in 
the position to rebuild and maintain confidence in the stability of the financial 
system. Deposit insurance is primarily directed at supporting the financial 
system stability. For this reason, the deposit insurance institution must use the 
‘confidence capital’ of the state, but at the same time ensure its independence 
as one of the prerequisites for the credibility of deposit insurance. For the 
governance of the deposit insurance scheme this means:
Freedom to take decisions and to act independently •  : Board and management 
of the deposit insurance institution should be given the greatest possible 
freedom to take decisions and to act within the legal framework.
Triggers and procedures •  : Clear trigger events that set off appropriate 
decisions and actions by the committees must be laid down. In doing so, 
however, the freedom to take decisions must not be limited unnecessarily. 
In addition, the processes for selected events should be defined and 
documented in advance (for example, in the case of an isolated illiquidity, 
the case of an expanding crisis, or of an actual system crisis).
Governing body •  : Fundamental decisions are reserved for the board, even 
if they are of an operational nature, such as the decision to make payments 
in the case of a claim or to release funds to continue financing banking 34 Deposit insurance architecture
services in the context of a ‘bridge finance’ solution. The governing body 
is also responsible for defining investment policy and for monitoring 
the exposure to risk of the deposit insurance fund. Similarly, setting the 
premiums to be paid by the individual insured institutions, the choice of 
the appropriate calculation method and the procedure for determining 
these premiums fall within the remit of the governing body. It is further 
responsible for the financial accounting and statement of accountability 
for the deposit insurance fund.
Management •  : The management is the executive for the decisions taken by 
the governing body. It supervises the implementation of measures decided 
upon, coordinates their effects with the other partners in the financial 
network, in particular with the financial market supervisory body, the 
central bank and the branches of government involved, and ensures the 
operational implementation of the administration and the management of 
the deposit insurance fund’s capital.
Transparency and accountability •  : Transparency regarding the fund’s assets, 
it’s financing mechanism and it’s returns is one of the central principles 
in the governance of the deposit insurance institution. To this end, it will 
make available to the public at least once a year a detailed report that 
the layman can also understand. Over a long period of time, very large 
amounts of capital will be accumulated in the deposit insurance fund. In 
addition to the information relating to the financial accounts, the deposit 
insurance institution must also provide regular information about its 
aims regarding investment policy, its decisions about and measures for 
the implementation of investment policy, and its exposure to risk or its 
assessment of the current and future risk.
The requirement of independence does not mean that members of the 
governing body cannot be appointed by the government, parliament or other 
state-run authorities. From the point of view of independence, however, it 
would not make much sense to appoint to key positions representatives of 
other institutions involved in the supervision of the financial market (for 
example, from the central bank or the bank supervisory authority) or industry 
associations. Members of the governing body should also be selected for 
a longer period of time (ideally four to six years) to reduce undue political 
influence, for example in the case of a change of government. Ideally the chair 
of the board will be someone with financial experience who is independent 
from both the financial industry and the government.35 Deposit insurance architecture
3.3.6 Administration
One of the aims of the management of the deposit insurance institution is 
cost efficiency. Administration costs reduce the returns on the fund. These 
assets must be covered from contributions by the insured institutions. The 
administration of the fund and the safeguarding and execution of its functions 
should therefore be carried out with the lowest possible operational costs.
One important question in connection with the governance of deposit 
insurance concerns the organizational independence of the institution. Should 
deposit insurance be put under the control of one of the other institutions 
entrusted with protecting the stability of the system, and if so, which? Or 
should it be organized as an independent element in the system of deposit 
insurance, which, although taking decisions and acting in close cooperation 
with other members of the system, is ultimately free to make and implement 
its own decisions?
The deposit insurance institution is ultimately an executive body, despite  • 
having aims that are mostly conceived of more broadly: In the case of 
a crisis it ensures an efficient payout of the covered deposits and makes 
available the funds for bridging measures. It could therefore easily 
be allocated to, or put under the control of one of the institutions that 
regulate the financial market. Reasons to support this idea include cross-
functional communication, simplified implementation of decisions taken 
by the financial market supervisors, better financial interfaces with the 
government or the central bank, and easier deployment of the accumulated 
funds within the federal finances.
The •   deposit insurance institution is, however, also a ‘signal body’: It signals 
to the depositor by its very existence and structure the safety of his or her 
deposits. The primary commodity of deposit insurance is its credibility. 
This is supported by its organizationally documented independence from 
all direct and indirect political influences. Organizational subordination to 
other financial market institutions can put this credibility at risk and lead 
to conflicts of interest.36 Deposit insurance architecture
3.3.7  Funding and pricing
The most important structural element in a deposit insurance scheme is its 
financing model whereas the focus is mainly on two questions:
(1)    Should a fund be set up so that it can be drawn upon to secure payments 
for deposit insurance, or should the means required for payments only be 
mobilized in the case of a claim?
(2)   How should the premiums that are to be paid by the insured financial 
institutions be set?
3.3.7.1  Ex-ante vs. ex-post funding
Deposit insurance schemes can fundamentally either allow for financing in 
advance of future payments, or allow for a financial model which, after a claim 
or payout occurs, sets out a distribution of the amount of the claim over the 
institutions insured. The former case is referred to as ex-ante financing of the 
deposit insurance scheme, the latter as ex-post financing. At the end of 2009 
the majority of European deposit insurance schemes were based on ex-ante 
financing of the deposit insurance scheme
42.
In the literature there is a broad discussion relating to the advantages and 
disadvantages of the two basic financing models
43. The most important points 
are summarized in figure 6. The discussion related to the consequences of the 
latest financial crisis shows that a modern deposit insurance scheme should 
be based on ex-ante financing. It can be assumed that, in the course of the 
ongoing reforms, most countries whose deposit insurance is currently still 
based on ex-post schemes will move over to ex-ante solutions too.
42  Own updates based on JRC (2008a,b) and data provided by IMF as of summer 2009.
43  FSF (2008), e.g. Hoelscher et al. (2006), IADI (2009).37 Deposit insurance architecture
Figure 6: Advantages and disadvantages of the two funding mechanisms
Advantages Disadvantages
Ex-post
•    Market discipline: Induces banks to 
monitor each other’s activities.
•    Potential payout-delays: The funds are 
not collected beforehand.
•    Procyclical effects: Commitments in 
poor economic situations may lead 
to a domino effect of bank failures, 
a renegotiation of condit-ions and/or 
a collapse of the DIS.
Ex-ante
•    Public confidence: Prompt 
reimbursement of depositors possible.
•    Smoothened premium payments: 
Reduced procyclical effects.
•    Reduced moral hazard: Ex-ante 
funding could incorporate risk-adjusted 
premiums.
•    Equitable and fair: All member 
institutions (including prospective failed 
institutions) contribute.
•    Adequate fund-size: Difficult to establish 
a fund of sufficient size. 
•    Adequate premium calculation: 
Difficulties in defining a ‘fair’ calculation 
method.
•    Administrative complexity: Organizational 
and strategic intricacy. 
The design of an ex-ante financing system is based on the following three 
basic building blocks:
(1)    Creation of a deposit insurance fund, which is funded by initial payments 
and periodic premium payments. It serves as a covering substrate for 
future payments in favor of the insured banks and/or depositors.
(2)    Determination of an investment policy for the fund capital which ensures 
that the risk-free invested capital is always disposable on short notice.
(3)   Creation of a fund administration, the costs of which must be covered 
from the returns on the fund and/or the contributions from those insured. 
Usually, the fund administration is part of the management remit of the 
deposit insurance institution.
3.3.7.2  Pricing and premiums
One of the central factors connected with the implementation of a modern 
deposit insurance scheme is the question as to the premiums that should 
be paid by the insured institutions to the deposit insurance fund. Theory 38 Deposit insurance architecture
and practice agree that ‘fair’ premiums are one of the basic prerequisites of 
a credible national deposit insurance scheme. But what does fairness mean 
in this context? And how are such ‘fair’ premiums arrived at? What effect do 
design features of the deposit insurance scheme have on pricing? What role 
do regulatory circumstances play with regard to determining fair insurance 
premiums for deposit insurance? How should systemic risks be incorporated 
in the calculation of premiums and who ultimately pays for these risks? 
These are examples of questions that are shaping the current discussion 
about the structure of premium models and the practical setting of insurance 
contributions for members of deposit insurance institutions; they will be 
discussed in the following sections.
3.3.7.2.1  Requirements of a pricing model
The conclusions of a large number of contributions to the discussion on 
the subject of deposit insurance pricing can be summarized as follows: The 
contribution made by any insured institution should stand in functional 
relationship to the risk that the institution’s membership causes to the deposit 
insurance fund
44. This risk consists primarily in the fact that the deposit 
insurance fund must satisfy the depositors’ requirements of an insolvent bank 
whose business activities have to be ‘bridged’. A second risk is represented 
by infection or spill-over effects, which go from one illiquid or insolvent 
financial institution to another member of the system and which can get the 
latter into difficulties too (with corresponding consequences for the deposit 
insurance fund).
Put simply, the contribution that an insured institution makes to the deposit 
insurance institution must cover the individual risk of default on covered 
deposits as well as the systemic risk for the insured deposits that emanates 
from the institution. A premium of this sort is ‘fair’ if it covers these two risk 
factors as precisely as possible and is translated into an annual contribution 
to be made by the bank.
44 According to article 12 of the Directive 2009/14/EC, the Commission shall submit possible 
models for introducing risk-based contributions as of 31 December 2009 which points up the 
importance of fair, member specific premium models as “ (...) a desirable enhancement to the 
existing framework (...)”. Several international commissions have tackled the theme, but the Joint 
Research Forum came up with concrete overview and suggestion on potential solutions. See JRC 
(2009, 2008a).39 Deposit insurance architecture
Therefore a pricing model must meet a series of requirements
45:
it must cover both the individual risk of default and the systemic risk of  • 
the insured institution as exactly as possible;
it must be comprehensible, understandable and justifiable for all  • 
stakeholders in the deposit insurance scheme;
despite the complexity of covering the adequate risk, it must be easy and  • 
cost-efficient to implement;
it must be sufficiently flexible to be able to represent changing institution- • 
specific, political and economic circumstances; and finally
the model should be able to be used in different European countries despite  • 
different circumstances.
Thus we get a simple risk function that derives the premium to be paid by 
an insured institution from the two risk parameters ‘specific risk’ (rim) and 
‘systemic risk’ (rs) and from the ‘institution-specific insurance basis’ (EDm):
Pm = f( rs, rim, EDm)
Pm:  Premium of insured institution 'm'
rs:  Systemic risk factor
rim:  Specific risk factor of institution 'm'
EDm: Eligible deposits of institution 'm'
A model of this sort, that satisfies both the theoretical requirement for 
fairness and the practical requirements of simplicity and comprehensibility, 
has unfortunately not been available up to now. But the discussion in the 
respective academic literature about risk-based premiums to compensate for 
deposit insurance benefits (that has already been going on for several years) 
has become more intensive in recent years. As early as September 2001, the 
Financial Stability Forum in its ‘recommendations’ pointed explicitly to the 
importance of a risk-based calculation of premiums
46. The European Forum 
of Deposit Insurers (EFDI) established a working group in 2002 that concerns 
itself with the integration of risk-based factors into the pricing of deposit 
insurance benefits and the monitoring of corresponding developments in 
European deposit insurance schemes. The International Association of Deposit 
45 An overview/a summary of the general tone can be found in JRC (2009).
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Insurers (IADI) recommended even in the basic version of its Core Principles 
published in 2002 the adoption of risk-based price models. In the revised 
version of 2009 this recommendation was repeated and strengthened
47. 
A multitude of other international financial institutions, including the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, have also made 
recommendations in recent years regarding the introduction of risk-based 
premium models. The results of the broad theoretical and practical discussion 
of this subject up to now can be summarized as follows:
Risk-based premium models meet the requirements mentioned above  • 
better than flat-rate models. They are also perceived as fairer by the 
insured institutions, since they include the individual risk exposure of 
those insured in the calculation of the premium level.
Risk-based models actually require a fund with ex-ante financing. They  • 
can, however, also be used in systems with ex-post financing (for example 
Italy). But the corresponding calculations are much more complex here 
and throw up numerous unanswered questions.
There is widespread agreement that both the specific and the systemic  • 
risks should be incorporated into the calculation of premiums
48. Little 
agreement exists regarding the appropriate parameters and models.
A scientifically-based and objective calculation of risk seems almost  • 
impossible. The approaches and models discussed in the literature point 
to more or less serious practical shortcomings in their application of 
calculating deposit insurance risks
49. The most likely method of calculating 
premiums in a fair way seems to be the expected loss model familiar from 
the credit sector
50. The numerous approaches based on option pricing 
models have proved not to be very suitable
51.
47 BCBS/IADI  (2009).
48 This general tone of academic (and practical) literature is mirrored on European level mainly 
through work composed by the European Commission, Joint Research Centre. Refer to JRC 
(2009, 2008a).
49 An overview on potential methods can be found in Laeven (2008).
50  E.g. Bennett (2001), Kuritzkes et al. (2003), Oliver, Wyman & Company (2002).
51 One base property of Merton (1977) and the appropriate second generation models is that it 
relies on bank’s asset value as well as on the appropriate volatility parameter which both are 
unobservable variables and thereafter prevented the model to be applied in practice. Several 
papers dealt with potential proxies, which is practically complicated because of a lack of data.41 Deposit insurance architecture
Empirical studies show that the premiums calculated for the insured  • 
institutions are mostly too low
52. But the anomaly seems to be larger with 
flat-rate models than with risk-based premium models.
In most risk-based models the systemic risk is either not incorporated at  • 
all or in an unsatisfactory way.
Risk-based premiums are a central factor in the reduction of moral hazard  • 
risk that can arise on the part of insured institutions when a deposit 
insurance scheme is implemented.
a. Calculation of the specific risk factor (rim)
The risk exposure of a bank or a stockbroker is determined by a series of 
factors. For the issues surrounding the risk specific to the deposit insurance 
we can restrict ourselves to two factors: the specific risk of an insured 
financial institution depends on the one hand on its business activities and on 
the other on the structure of the balance sheet of the institution at the time.
Business activity:  •  The risk-oriented assessment of the business activities 
can be centered on the type and risk exposure of the assets as well as on 
the off-balance-sheet investments of an insured institution. It is mainly 
expressed in the business model of the financial institution. A further risk 
indicator is the level of maturity transformation with which a financial 
institution operates: Banks transform short-term deposits into long-term 
assets in the form of loans and investments. Through term transformation, 
deposits that mature in the short term are ‘immobilized’. A liquidity risk 
therefore arises for the bank. In addition, assets with a longer maturity also 
carry a greater risk regarding the danger of shortfall.
Balance sheet structure:  •  Liquidity risks based on balance sheet structure 
are a function of the available first and second degree liquidity, of the 
liquidity requirement from irrevocable limits, the current possibility of 
liquidating assets and the re-financing capacity of a financial institution. 
Indirectly, the equity base of the financial institution also plays an 
important role in this connection. Among other things, it influences the 
re-financing capacity and the re-financing costs of the institution.
52  See e.g. Laeven (2008) and references herein. 42 Deposit insurance architecture
For the calculation of the institutions specific risk exposure the risk of 
liquidity demand is of primary interest. This refers to the risk that depositors 
might become convinced that a bank can no longer or no longer completely 
meet its payment obligations, and therefore begin to withdraw their deposits 
in a quantity that threatens the existence of the bank. Business activity (or the 
business model) and the structure of the balance sheet stand in a functional 
relationship. Focusing on specific areas of business requires a specific 
balance sheet structure with corresponding typical liquidity risks. It therefore 
seems sensible to assess the risk exposure related to liquidity of an insured 
institution by means of both of these factors.
This institution-specific risk factor (rim) must be easy to calculate and yet 
expresses the liquidity-related risk exposure of the institution as selectively 
as possible. It can be calculated as an aggregated risk indicator and should 
include the following risks that are characteristic of the institutions’ liquidity 
risk exposure:
Extent of the maturity transformation •  : Calculation of the duration gap 
between selected active and passive investments;
Re-financing capacity •  : Ability of the institution to generate additional 
liquidity. To this end, various proxy investments can, in turn, be drawn 
on;
Relative liquidity strength •  : Available liquidity in relation to liquidity 
required;
General risk exposure of the institution •  : Capital resource base (for example 
by means of tier I capital ratio) and/or risk-weighted assets relative to all 
assets;
Earning capacity •  : Cost/income ratio, structure of returns, volatility of 
returns, etc.
So, risk indicators should, on the one hand, represent the business activity or 
the business model, and on the other hand evaluate the capital structure. They 
should be easy to collect or have already been collected in any case by the 
bank (in other connections). The proxy variables needed to calculate the risk 
indicators should also:43 Deposit insurance architecture
be significant indicators in the context of the permanent monitoring of the  • 
insured institution by supervisory authorities, and
be selected in such a way that data that are already available or need to be  • 
collected in other connections can be used. In this way, the additional cost 
to the insured institution can be minimized.
Possible starting points are an assessment of the solvency, of the liquidity and 
of the profitability of the insured institution. The institute-specific risk (rim) 
can then be expressed based on the following simple formula:
rim = a(rS) + b(rL) +/– c(rP) 
rim:    Aggregated specific risk indicator
of institu-tion 'm'
rS: Solvency  indicator
rL: Liquidity  indicator
rP: Performance  indicator
a, b, c:  Weighting coefficient
Alternatively, a very straightforward, although also less subtle approach can 
be chosen: In the extreme case only one single factor
53 is chosen to determine 
the risk exposure of the insured institution, such as a form of the equity 
coverage ratio (for example, on the basis of Basel 2 indicators) or a simple 
liquidity ratio. This factor then expresses the institute-specific risk.
b. Calculation of the systemic risk factor (rs)
The term ‘systemic risk’ refers to contagion and spill-over effects that 
can lead directly or indirectly to claims in a deposit insurance scheme. In 
connection with this systemic risk, three questions usually arise: The question 
of quantifying the risk, the question about the insurance carrier and the 
question of risk compensation.
Quantifying the systemic risk •  : On the one hand, the systemic risk is 
a function of the stability of a financial intermediation system at the time 
and the national economy concerned, on the other of the market structure 
of the national banking and financial system. An oligopolistic competition 
structure, in which just a few big banks hold large shares of the market, 
exposes the financial system to a higher systemic risk in a crisis than 
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a financial system with an atomistic competition structure
54. Additionally, 
the systemic risk is influenced by the stability of the financial system 
at any given time and the current financial strength of the participants 
in the system. Ultimately the existence of so-called ‘system-relevant’ 
financial institutions is the decisive fact defining the level of systemic 
risk. A scientifically-based quantification of the systemic risk does not, 
however, seem possible: For the calculation of the consequences of 
infection effects, which go from one illiquid or insolvent institution to 
other insured financial institutions, neither the theoretical models nor the 
data required to test the models and to derive forecast values from them, 
are available at the moment. The quantification of the corresponding risk 
thus becomes a primarily political decision.
Compensation for systemic risk •  : System-relevant financial institutions 
pay, in addition to the premium for their individual default risk, a premium 
as compensation for the systemic risk incurred by them for the deposit 
insurance. To this end, the first step is to identify these system-relevant 
banks. The sensible way for this to be done is by the supervisory authority, 
the central bank or another government body. The identification of system 
relevance can also be delegated to the deposit insurance institution.
Insurance carrier for systemic risks •  : The compensation for the systemic 
risk will flow to the carrier for this risk type. That is, on the one hand, the 
deposit insurance fund, which sees itself exposed to a greater payout risk 
because of contagion and spill-over effects. Since the deposit insurance 
fund will hardly ever be able to cover the entire default risk for the 
deposits of all system-relevant banks, a credible deposit insurance scheme 
always needs additional re-insurance from the state. It is sensible that this 
re-insurance is also made in the form of an explicit guarantee promise. As 
a result, part of the premium for compensation of the systemic risk belongs 
to the state.
The systemic risk factor expresses the basic risk of the financial system and/
or of a specified group of institutions. The factor derives from base 1: If the 
systemic risk as a whole is estimated as being higher for one type of bank 
or one group of banks, the factor is raised (for example to 1.2); conversely, 
a reduced systemic risk can be weighted with a factor below 1. By including 
such a premium factor for systemic risk as a multiplier in the risk function an 
54  To measure the concentration, a countries´ Herfindahl index can be calculated (as the sum of the 
squares of all the institutions’ market shares in terms of total assets). For data refer to European 
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institution specific differentiation in the premium can be arrived in an easy 
way.
As far as method is concerned, two possibilities can be discussed here:
Standardized rate for all insured institutions •  : A uniform rate (rs) is set for 
all insured institutions. The factor expresses the respective assessment of 
the systemic risk. If the system stability reduces, the factor can be raised, 
and vice versa. The same can be done (with the reverse sign) in case of 
crisis to relieve the banks and to prevent counter-productive effects.
Differentiated rate for different types of institution •  : The systemic risk factor 
is organized as a function of the risk for specific institution profiles.
For the reasons cited above, a calculation of the institution-specific systemic 
risk contribution of each individual insured institution seems impractical or 
simply impossible.
3.3.7.2.2  Methodology of premium calculation
By using an aggregated risk indicator (rim) the second step is to allocate 
different risk classes to the institutions. Each risk class corresponds to 
a premium factor. For the premium factor a specific bandwidth can be set.
Risk classes:  •  The number of risk categories determines the degree of 
differentiation in the premium system. Here, too, simplicity should be the 
first commandment. At the same time, however, in choosing the number 
of risk classes and bands, incentives to improve the risk behavior of the 
insured institutions should be given.
Systemic risk factor:  •  The systemic risk factor is a multiplier. It can move in 
a range (for example between 0.8 and 1.2) and is periodically determined 
by government.
Bandwidth:  •  The bandwidth expresses the range between the individual 
risk classes. The wider the band selected, the harder it will be for an 
insured institution to migrate from one risk class to another (and thus to 
get a different premium factor).46 Deposit insurance architecture
The following figure illustrates the procedure by means of a simple 
example:
Figure 7: An example of premium calculation 
The premium arrived at in this way (for example 10 bp) is subsequently 
multiplied by the premium factor for the systemic risk (for example by 1.2, 
which gives a premium to be paid to the deposit insurance fund of 12 bp times 
eligible deposits (ED)).
3.3.7.2.3  An examination of practice in the EU
An analysis at the end of 2008
55 of the deposit insurance fund present in the 
27 EU member states shows that up to now a risk-based premium system has 
only been introduced in 11 countries. Of these, only seven have a structure 
based on an ex-ante supply of the fund. The following figure shows the 
current position regarding financing and premium models.
55  JRC (2008a), Annex III and data provided by IMF as of summer 2008.47 Deposit insurance architecture
Figure 8: Funding mechanism in EU 27 
Source: Based on information of IMF, European Commission and own updates
The fact that so few deposit insurance systems in practice introduce risk-
based premium models, even though the positive assessment of them is today 
largely uncontested, can be traced back to the fact that the Directive 94/19/EC 
on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes had left the organization of the pricing models 
to the individual countries. The revised version in 2009 at least recommends 
the introduction of risk-based premium models, without, however, addressing 
specific aspects of the model to be applied.48 Deposit insurance architecture
Lessons from the financial crisis
•    The existence of a substantial fund capital strengthens the credibility of the deposit 
insurance institution and thereby reduces the likelihood that the fund will have to 
be called upon. Ex-ante financing of the fund is therefore preferable to the ex-post 
financing model.
•    Only risk-based premium models can take account of the different risk exposure 
that a specific bank represents for the deposit insurance institution. They reduce the 
moral hazard behavior of the insured institution and correspond most closely to the 
requirement of fairness.
•    Along with the institution-specific risk, the systemic risk has to be incorporated into 
the premium calculation. Only in this way can compensation be made for explicit 
(and implicit) guarantees, at least in a rudimentary way, and influence be exercised 
over the moral hazard behavior of the system-relevant institutions.
3.3.7.3 Fund  size
Establishing the optimal target capital volume for a fund is undoubtedly 
a key issue for designing a deposit protection system. The optimal fund 
size is directly derived from the target set by the deposit insurance fund and 
described by the terms ‘confidence function’ and ‘protection function’. The 
more credible the protection, the higher the confidence in this protection and 
the lower the probability of the necessity to access the fund. Conversely, the 
target capital also generates moral hazard effects. The higher the protection, 
the higher the risk of a lack of risk-adequate behavior on part of the banks 
and their depositors
56.
On the one hand, the fund size volume should be determined in such a way 
that objective and credible protection for the deposits is ensured. On the 
other hand, the fund volume should neither negatively affect the insured 
bank’s risk-readiness nor the investors risk conduct:
Objective protection •  : Established funds offer sufficient protection if they 
ensure effective losses to be covered in the long term, i.e., payments 
from bank insolvencies and financing bypassing measures. The period 
addressed here refers to several decades.
56 For a bank, morally hazardous conduct may be displayed as readiness to assume higher 
business risks. For investors, too high protection may lead to negligence of monitoring duties (for 
instance, by transferring investments to banks with exaggerated profit promises).49 Deposit insurance architecture
Credible protection •  : Promised protection is credible not only if it is 
underpinned by objective formula comprehensible to experts, but also 
if it comprehensively signals to depositors inexperienced with financial 
matters that the deposits are secure.
Prevention of moral hazard •  : Morally hazardous effects are not so much 
influenced by the vast fund volume but rather by the outstanding eligible 
and/or covered deposits and methods of contribution selected. 
The fund capital volume ultimately depends on the risk to which the deposit 
insurance fund considers itself exposed: The risk being that payments must 
be made within a certain time period (for example one year). This risk is 
determined by the following five factors:
(1)   The probability of an insured institution having to call a claim within 
a certain time period;
(2)    The volume of covered deposits in insolvent or illiquid institutions at the 
time of calling the deposit insurance fund;
(3)   The effective amounts to be covered by the deposit insurance fund in 
the event of a loss, taking into account all payout reducing recovery 
transactions (for example liquidation of bank assets, coverage management 
etc.);
(4)    The deposit insurance fund’s diversification potential;
(5)   The contagion and spill-over effects in the financial and economic 
system.
3.3.7.3.1  Probability of calling a claim (probability of default (PD))
Assessing the failure probability of a bank is presumably the most difficult 
task in determining the target fund capital. In theory, there are many methods 
and procedures for calculating the failure probability. They can be divided 
into three categories:50 Deposit insurance architecture
Indicator-based procedure •  : Determination of the failure risk based on 
qualitative and quantitative indicators, subsumed into a risk score and 
assigned to a failure probability
57.
Market-based procedure •  : Various procedures based on option prices 
belong here, but also the consideration of spreads on the CDS market
58, the 
inter- banking business, or other interest-based instruments.
Rating-based procedure •  : Basically a type of indicator-based procedures 
leading to rating classifications. Ideally, ratings of independent agencies 
or recognized private ratings are being considered.
All these approaches have a common weakness: On the one hand, statistical 
fundamentals from the past are missing, and on the other hand, causality is 
insufficient if past events are projected into the future. Furthermore, statistical 
calculations are made difficult by the presupposed skewed distribution 
function of losses (long periods of low losses contrast with short periods 
of high losses) and missing independence of loss events (presumably high 
correlation between bank insolvencies in the event of crisis resulting from 
mutual dependencies).
For this reason, there is no ‘correct’ method from a theoretical point of 
view. Therefore, we should primarily aim at the criterion of practicability in 
determining failure probability: What is already available or, respectively, 
what is yet to be determined or calculated in the course of other supervisory 
functions.
3.3.7.3.2  The amount of covered deposits in the event of loss 
The second variable refers to covered deposits actually at the bank’s disposal 
in the event of loss
59. This amount can be elicited with a certain reliability for 
each bank by periodically:
assessing the number of depositors, as well as the appropriate covered  • 
deposits;
57 This approach is currently adopted in practice and mainly based on fundamental data JRC 
(2008a).
58  E.g. Pennacchi (2009) and references herein.
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using the average values of the past three years as a basis; • 
correcting this amount with a factor ‘∆’ (whereby ∆<1, since it must be  • 
assumed that a bank will be dispossessed of those covered deposits below 
the maximally ensured sum at the first signs of a crisis, despite credible 
depositor protection).
This correction factor is a psychological factor - the more credible the 
depositor protection, the higher the factor (i.e. the lower the prophylactic 
reduction of liquidity).
3.3.7.3.3  Effective payout demand in the event of loss 
The effective failure covered by the DIF
60 is usually much lower than the sum 
of secured deposits (i.e. EAD) because:
the bank in jeopardy is able to recover • 
61 a part of the receivables with its 
own assets;
in some countries a liquidity pool is created by (over-) defraying covered  • 
deposits with domestic assets, capable of satisfying most receivables (for 
example with general commitments, pledging, repo-transactions or ad hoc 
emission of bonds etc.);
the existence of a credible depositor insurance slows down and reduces  • 
the amounts of depositors’ withdrawals, hence allowing the bank and 
the supervising authorities additional time for restructuring or organized 
liquidation.
3.3.7.3.4 Diversification  potential
The deposit insurance fund’s portfolio is comprised of insured institutions 
with different risk exposure. Similar to a stock portfolio, the risk for a group 
of insured parties is lower than the combined individual risks for each insured 
party. A risk-reducing diversification effect may therefore occur in the deposit 
insurance fund. The requirements for this to happen are as follows:
60  Loss given default (LGD).
61 As already mentioned earlier LGD can be expressed through 1- Recovery rate (rr).52 Deposit insurance architecture
incomplete or as low as possible equity profit correlation of the insured  • 
institutes;
an as broad as possible basis of insured institutes; • 
an as low as possible spread of covered deposits of individual banks  • 
around the average value.
The diversification of non-systemic risks for the DIF tends to reduce the 
premium rate for the insured parties. In other words; insuring the deposits 
of an entire financial system is more favorable than insuring the deposits of 
individual banks
62. However, contagion and spillover effects strongly limit 
these diversification effects, as the following section will show.
3.3.7.3.5  Contagion and spillover effects
Deposit insurance basically resembles a normal insurance. However, there 
are important differences that should be considered when calculating the 
fund’s target capital and insurance rates.
In contrast to life and indemnity insurances for instance, the diversification 
potential of depositor protection insurance is strongly limited as losses in 
a national as well as in the international financial system correlate with each 
other. The reason for this correlation is not only the strong interdependence 
of banks, but also functional dependencies between the financial system and 
the rest of the national economy. Payouts (and risks) of depositor insurance 
directly correlate with the stability of the financial system. This correlation 
of the failures relevant for deposit insurance goes back to contagion and 
spillover effects:
Contagion effects •  : Banks infect each other with liquidity problems. Due 
to the close connection between financial institutes in the inter-banking 
business, liquidity problems can quickly spread from one bank to the next, 
as clearly obvious in the current financial crisis
63. Experience shows that 
62  There weren’t many empirical studies so far covering this aspect. An example can be found in 
Laeven (2008).
63 “ Financial innovation and global market developments have transformed the nature of liquidity 
risk in recent years. The funding of some banks has shifted towards a greater reliance on the 
capital markets, which are potentially a more volatile source of funding than traditional retail 
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customers tend to transfer their deposits from threatened to seemingly 
secure banks, whereby the latter may gain additional resilience
64.
Spillover effects •  : Recent history of financial crises, beginning with the 
Asian crisis at the end of the 90s until the current crisis shows, that 
a financial system crisis may lead to an economic crisis in other markets 
outside of the financial system, and even to a recession or a general 
economic crisis in extreme cases.
In conclusion, this means that the deposit insurance fund does not only 
have to cover the sum of ‘expected’ losses, as calculated based on the risk 
exposition of individual insured institutions, but that it should also maintain 
additional risk coverage for so-called ‘unexpected’ losses. These unexpected 
(or ‘systemic’) losses have to enter into the calculation of insurance rates.
Both, diversification and spillover effects affect the insurance rates but with 
different algebraic signs. To date, there is no empirical examination of these 
effects. We assume however, that (cost-increasing) contagion and spillover 
effects of systemic risks by far exceed the (cost-reducing) diversification 
effect of non-systemic risks.
3.3.7.3.6 Fund  credibility
Regardless of objective requirements, the fund size has to be determined 
carefully to convince the insured depositors and the public of the fact that 
covered deposits are truly protected in the event of loss. As mentioned 
before: While a too low coverage for the eligible deposits undermines the 
credibility of the fund, a too high coverage increases the risk of morally 
hazardous conduct on part of the insured stakeholders. However, the target 
capital should be adjusted to the ‘normal case’ of expected losses over a long 
time period (for example a decade), as extraordinary losses will have to be 
covered by additional state warranties in the case of a grave system crisis. 
No deposit protection system, regardless of its design, could actually cover 
insured investments to the full extent.
64  See also Kroszner/Melick (2008).54 Deposit insurance architecture
3.3.7.4 Investment  policy
The DIF collects one of the largest capital sums of a national economy. 
First, this capital has to be invested securely to conserve and increase value, 
and second, it has to be at the disposal of the national economy, directly 
or indirectly. To this end, the deposit insurance fund requires an adequate 
investment policy and strategy. It shall define permissible investment 
categories, acceptable risk exposure, profit goals derived on this basis, and 
determine the conditions related to terms and liquidity.
In particular, fundamentals of such an investment policy are:
Investments have to be risk-free or exposed to minimal risks only. This  • 
refers to both market and operational risks as well as counter-party risks. 
Calculations of the capital stock growth should therefore be based on the 
risk-free interest rate.
There is no connection between the investments and the insured institutions  • 
and items allowed. Fund assets must not be placed in the financial sector 
directly or indirectly.
Quick liquidation of large items without direct influence on financial  • 
markets. The DIF has to be able to liquidate its assets quickly and without 
stock price losses in the event of crisis. At the same time, liquidation 
must not trigger or strengthen negative stock price effects on the financial 
markets.
It should be possible to invest assets directly in the national economy or  • 
in support of the monetary purposes of the Central Bank. For this reason, 
they are either transacted through the state (which leads to a relief for the 
capital market) or deposited at the Central Bank.
Publicly presenting and explaining the investment policy of the deposit 
insurance fund is part of the transparency requirement.
3.3.7.5 Initial  financing
Establishing new or restructuring existing deposit insurance systems raises 
the question of how to ensure that the fund is functional from the outset or 
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system should fulfill its main function from the start to inspire confidence in 
the depositors of insured institutes.
All known systems augment the usually very large target capital by collecting 
regular insurance premiums from insured institutions. But the target capital 
is usually not achieved for several decades. Therefore, a deposit insurance 
fund requires initial financing that quickly puts target capital (or at least 
a substantial part of it) at its disposal and thus endows it with credibility 
required for its functionality.
This can only be achieved if the DIF can demonstrate quickly and credibly 
that it is capable of satisfying potential claims. To this end, large start-up 
capital is required (hereafter referred to as DIFmin). Several possibilities for 
obtaining this start-up capital are under consideration:
a) State  warranty;
b)  Contribution of capital by insured institutes;
c) Security-based  financing;
d)  Combination of ex-ante with ex-post financing.
3.3.7.5.1 State  warranties
The state and/or the Central Bank guarantee(s) the predefined starting amount 
without actually providing the financial means. Simultaneously, capital stock 
accumulates from the yearly premium payments of the insured parties. This 
accrual continues until the warranty and the capital stock reach the defined 
maximal level. Then the state warranty is annually reduced by the amount of 
newly paid premiums or financial means from profits realized through asset 
management. Should payouts occur, resulting in a fund decrease under the 
defined maximal level, a federal warranty automatically takes effect for the 
emerging difference.
The following figure shows the main characteristics of this solution:56 Deposit insurance architecture
Figure 9: The impact of state warranties
The DIF disposes over DIF •  min coverage capacity from the start;
The periodic payments of the insured parties continuously increase the  • 
coverage capacity;
After the defined maximal coverage capacity DIF •  max is reached at t1, the 
state warranty will be reduced gradually;
In the event of loss (here at t •  2) with a payout ‘Z’, the state warranty 
automatically increases by ‘Z’, so that the fund shows the defined 
coverage sum at all times;
If no losses occur, the liquid means of the DIF reach the defined coverage  • 
sum at t3;
In the event of loss, the payment obligation of the insured parties is  • 
extended (from t3 to t4 in the example). The extension is reduced by profits 
from capital stock that has not been taken into account for the figure for 
reasons of simplification.
Advantages Disadvantages
•    High credibility of the declared warranty
•    Simple implementation
•    High acceptance in the financial sector
•    Conformity with traditional forms of state 
warranty
•    No self-energizing effects
•    Political discussion (state influence)
•    Risk costs of the warranty must be borne by 
the state
•    In contradiction to the ‘responsible party 
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3.3.7.5.2  Contribution of capital by insured institution
With advance payments made by the insured parties it is possible to reach 
coverage up to the DIFmin level. This basic mechanism is identical with the 
previously mentioned warranty solution. The main characteristics of this 
solution are:
The amount to be effected is calculated in the same way as the risk-based  • 
premiums, i.e., an insured party with a higher risk makes higher 
contributions;
The contributions are entered into the books of the insured institutions  • 
as an asset (i.e. as subordinate debt in the books of the deposit insurance 
fund);
Interest is annually added to the financial contributions at a risk-free  • 
interest rate (interest rate is determined by the Central Bank for instance). 
The interest is credited to the insured party but not paid out;
If a loss occurs at t •  2, then the outstanding payments Z are covered by the 
special reserves made up of the interest payments. Not before R<Z, the 
remaining difference will be demanded from the insured institutes as an 
additional obligatory contribution;
From t •  1 onwards, outstanding premiums are applied against the depletion 
of the initial financing amounts.
Advantages Disadvantages
•    Causer-based financing
•    Simple implementation
•    Blocked liquidity 
•    Probably low acceptance in the industry
3.3.7.5.3 Security-based  financing
Security-based financing is generally functionally identical with the above 
mentioned financing solutions. The main difference is that advance financing 
of DIFmin is ensured by emitting bonds (notes) through the DIF. The main 
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•    The DIF emits the notes in the total amount of DIFmin;
•    The notes feature progressive maturity (for example yearly tranches);
•    They are paid back between t1 and t3, in coordination with the capital stock 
growth comprised of premium payments of the insured parties;
•    The notes are booked at the insured institutes through obligatory signing 
(following the same key as in the solution above). In a second step they 
may be placed on the secondary market;
•    Banks may count the notes against their legal liquidity requirements and 
use them as coverage for repo-transactions;
•    Thereby a guaranteed coverage similar to suggestion a) would be reached, 
with the difference of the coverage capital DIFmin actually being at disposal 
(which means increased credibility of the fund).
Advantages Disadvantages
•    High flexibility through various options for 
emission
•    Opportunity to trade notes: Tapping into 
a broad capital basis
•    Broad basis for financing
•    High credibility
•    High acceptance in the financial sector
•    Useful Central Bank instrument 
•    Higher complexity/higher expenses
•    Competition with other financing instruments 
of the state
3.3.7.5.4  Combination of ex-post and ex-ante financing 
Combinations of ex-ante and ex-post solutions (i.e. with obligatory additional 
contribution) are, of course, conceivable. There are two major options:
Coverage of DIF •  max through limited call for additional cover in case of 
a loss
The insured institutes make their regular annual premium payments 
(ex-ante) up to the defined coverage level DIFmax and are obliged to make 
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coverage level DIFmax is reached, , the call for additional cover may be 
abolished. 
Coverage of DIF •  max through permanent call for additional cover in case 
of a loss
The same combination of ex-ante and ex-post financing is as described 
above. In contrast, the insured parties are permanently obliged to make 
additional payments in the case of claims. The call for additional cover 
increases in the event of loss and would be reduced based on capital stock 
profits respectively.
Advantages Disadvantages
•    Simplicity
•    High acceptance in the sector
•    Lower confidence
•    No solution for general weaknesses attached 
to ex-post systems
3.3.8 Resolution  regime
3.3.8.1  Why a special Resolution Regime?
In the case of a system-relevant bank the specific intermediation function 
of banks in the national economy may result in liquidity problems or even 
in threatening insolvency of a financial institute, which may have a major 
immediate impact on other financial institutes and the national economy 
as a whole. The bankruptcy law applicable for general types of companies 
is generally not suited for balancing or preventing these negative external 
effects in case of a bank insolvency. Hence, most countries have enforced 
a bankruptcy law or insolvency regime aimed specifically at banks and 
financial institutions.
The goal of such legal framework is to make it possible to transact an 
imminent or occurring insolvency of a financial institution under guidance of 
the responsible authority. So, claims of depositors can be maximally satisfied 
and the negative externals arising from the insolvency for the financial system 
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be called ‘Special Resolution Regime’ (SRR) in the following
65. Empirical 
studies conclude that there is a positive connection between the design of 
a national SRR and the resilience of the financial intermediation system
66. 
3.3.8.2  The three pillars of a Special Resolution Regime
The concrete design of bank insolvency regulations is always exposed 
to strong political influences. There is a wide range of SRR solutions in 
Europe: Every country selects a different approach in dealing with threatened 
financial institutions
67. The vast theoretical and empirical literature on this 
topic
68 agrees that an efficient SRR is built on three pillars:
(1)    timely recognition of a looming illiquidity or insolvency;
(2)   timely initiation of preventive measures to secure existing assets and 
liquidity; and
(3)    timely shutdown or recapitalization of insolvent financial institutions.
For all three points the word ‘timely’ is of great importance. When problems 
are recognized too late, their solution is not only much more difficult, but 
also significantly more expensive
69. In all three points the deposit insurance 
system plays an important role, whereby its implementation undoubtedly 
focuses on steps two and three. The effect of a crisis is mainly a matter of how 
quickly jeopardized financial institutions are declared ‘illiquid’ or ‘insolvent’ 
and how quickly they are restructured by means of appropriate measures
70.
3.3.8.2.1  Timely recognition of crises
The symptoms of a financial system crisis are easily recognizable. Bank-runs, 
massive transfer of depositor items between financial institutions, cumulative 
liquidity problems and insolvencies of financial institutions are the main 
characteristics of such a crisis. Timely recognition of a crises (or potential 
problems leading to a crisis) for initiating prophylactic measures through 
the elements of the financial security system has to begin earlier - before the 
65  Other designations for the same are, for instance, “Bank Insolvency Resolution Program”.
66 Beck/Laeven  (2008).
67 Cihák/Decressin  (2007).
68  Eisenbeis/Kaufman (2007), Su (2006), Poghosyan/Cihák (2009).
69 Poghosyan/Cihák  (2009).
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system crisis as such occurs. But it is not that easy to know whether a financial 
institution is approaching a critical situation or already on the verge of a crisis. 
The triggers signaling an imminent crisis prompt supervising authorities or 
other elements of the financial security network to take appropriate action. 
The restructuring methods differ vastly from country to country
71.
Empirical studies show that most European countries use a combination of 
risk assessment, based on financial reporting data and crisis indicators, rating 
models and statistical analyses for an early warning system of this kind
72:
Crisis indicators •  : The use of CAMEL
73 variables is widely spread: They 
combine indicators for equity or capital ratios, asset quality, management, 
earnings/profit situation, and liquidity. The definitions, quantification 
and combinations of individual variables as crisis indicators, as well as 
the determination of threshold values that may signal an imminent crisis, 
differ from country to country. Apart from the classical CAMEL variables, 
risk key data specific to banks or indicators for the financial and economic 
environment often enter into the risk analysis of supervising authorities.
Rating models •  : The crisis indicator results are mostly combined into 
a rating model which ideally results in an appropriate rating. The rating 
classification represents either the ‘proximity’ of the financial situation to 
a predefined crisis threshold value or the probability of receiving a better/
worse rating within a certain period (and hence approaching or diverging 
a critical situation)
74.
Statistical analyses •  : Statistical analyses aiming to assess the failure 
probability of a financial institution (or the probability of its surviving) 
based on data relating to the past or estimations of future profits and losses 
belong to the most complex early warning systems
75.
71  See also Cihák/Decressin (2007).
72 Poghosyan/Cihák (2009) provide a good overview of this topic; we shall rely on their 
consideration here.
73  Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earning/Profitability, Liquidity.
74 The SEER-model used by the U.S. Federal Reserve may be taken as an example (SEER: 
System for Estimate Examination Ratings).
75 The SAABA-model of the French Commission of Banks (“... for banking analysis”), or the 
model of the Italian Central Bank, both of which are based on estimating future losses of the 
financial institutions see exemplify such models (see f.e. Poghosyan/Cihák (2009)). Statistical 
models use many other supervising institutions such as the German Federal Bank.62 Deposit insurance architecture
Market information tends to be incorporated in early warning systems more 
frequently, even though not on a very systematic basis. Changes of stock 
prices and spreads in the financing sector, especially in the interbanking 
business, are the focal point here. As a consequence of the financial crisis, 
interest rates offered in the investment business will most likely draw more 
attention in the future
76.
The development and use of such early warning systems is useful in many 
respects. On the one hand, they may provide the financial security network 
institutions with clues about a developing crisis. But they also increase the 
awareness of all stakeholders in the system for the determinants of such 
a crisis. Thirdly, if made public, the results of the early warning systems 
increase market discipline by informing market participants in a timely 
manner of a change in risk exposure of a financial institution and by applying 
pressure to management as a consequence.
3.3.8.2.2  Timely initiation of preventive measures
The recognition of imminent crises forms the basis for timely initiation of 
preventative measures on part of the authorities and it is an indispensable 
requisite for containing or overcoming a crisis. A look back at the history 
of past financial crises around the world shows that such measures were 
unfortunately not taken early enough, which resulted in its reduced effects 
and higher costs for overcoming the crisis.
Such preventive measures, mostly enacted and implemented under 
tight cooperation between the supervising authorities, deposit insurance 
organization(s) and the Central Bank at best, can be assigned to one of the 
following categories.
Assistance management •  : The mildest form of a preventive measure places 
the financial institution under the management (or co-management at 
best) of an administrator appointed by the supervising authorities or 
deposit insurance organization. From the perspective of deposit insurance, 
his main task is to prevent a worsening of the situation with regards to 
liquidity and thus threats to the deposits and an increased risk for the 
deposit insurance fund respectively;
76  The example of the Icelandic Kaupthing bank shows that a higher interest rate offer for deposits 
goes hand-in-hand with increased risk exposure for the bank.63 Deposit insurance architecture
Bridge bank •  : Establishing a ‘bridge bank’ may be the solution if a financial 
institution with a positive market value is in jeopardy to become illiquid 
or insolvent before a purchase and assumption transaction (see the next 
point) succeeds. The supervising authority and/or the deposit insurance 
organization establish(es) a bridge bank which takes over the assets and 
liabilities of the jeopardized or insolvent bank in part to ensure that basic 
functions continue (mostly account and payment transactions as well as 
credit operation). Usually, management of the insolvent bank is replaced 
by external administrators appointed by the supervising authority or the 
deposit insurance institution. Their task is to continue the bank’s business 
on a reduced basis over a limited period of time (mostly between half 
a year and a year), in order to protect existing assets and reduce risks 
for the depositors. Establishment of a bridge bank is useful if immediate 
shutdown or liquidation of a financial institution is not a consideration due 
to system resilience, or if several financial institutions simultaneously run 
into difficulties in a massive crisis. Bridge bank measures are primarily 
a matter of gaining time for essential recapitalization and restructuring 
measures
77.
Purchase & Assumption (P&A): •   In this widely spread solution it is 
a matter of finding a purchaser for the assets and liabilities of the 
jeopardized financial institution in part or as a whole
78. Supervising 
authorities ensure a limited transitional financing for the bank or arrange 
for reduced continuation of business. In some countries financial means 
of the deposit insurance fund are accessible to this end. Such supporting 
measures are taken only if there are justified prospects for realizing an 
appropriate P&A solution for the short term.
These preventive measures are also known as ‘Open Bank Assistance’ 
(OBA) since the endangered bank is basically kept ‘open’, but its business 
activities are restricted
79. OBA measures are mostly implemented under 
close cooperation and with the financial support of the deposit insurance 
organization. The use of financial means from a deposit insurance fund 
is always justified if the cost is less, in comparison to shutting down the 
financial institution and paying out covered deposits (although it is of course 
difficult to calculate this in advance). The involvement of deposit insurance 
77  See also Ho (2008), Su (2006).
78  For further information refer to http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/ch3pas.pdf.
79  “There are two types of possible resolution transactions: open-bank assistance (OBA) and closed-
bank resolution (CBR). In an OBA transaction, which is used in rare situations, the FDIC provides 
financial assistance to the bank while it remains open for specific reasons”. (JRC (2008b)).64 Deposit insurance architecture
funds has to be in the best interest of the protected investor
80 independently 
of other goals of the financial market supervision or other financial network 
partners.
3.3.8.2.3  Timely shutdown or recapitalization
If bridging measures are no longer an option, then the insolvent financial 
institution has to be shut down as quickly as possible. If this does not take 
place in a timely manner, the risk for the deposit insurance fund increases 
substantially. Experience shows that state authorities often hesitate to make 
the necessary decision to shut down an institution. Such decisions are almost 
always exposed to political pressures, especially in the case of larger banks 
and financial institutions. Additionally, practical examples clearly show that 
only timely and tough measures can reduce risks and costs for the deposit 
protection fund. Adequate conclusions can only be drawn and implemented 
if the deposit insurance organization is able to draw the right conclusions and 
act independent of political influence. Shutdown decisions should be made 
based on predefined criteria in the course of a standardized decision process 
and implemented following a predefined procedure. Following Su (2006) 
and under consideration of the experience in 2008 and 2009, it is possible to 
define a number of principles for designing measures for overcoming a crisis 
from the perspective of deposit insurance. In particular, the following might 
be taken into consideration:
(1)   The legal and regulatory conditions should determine the function of 
the deposit insurance system in the course of open-bank assistance 
(OBA) or closed-bank resolution (CBR) as clearly as possible. Mandate, 
responsibilities, and competencies of the deposit insurance organization 
should be carefully adjusted to each other.
(2)   At the same time, the coordination and cooperation between the involved 
network partners should be (pre)defined and ensured. In particular, this 
includes securing timely and comprehensive exchange of information 
between the financial market supervising authority, the deposit insurance 
institution, the Central Bank and other institutions involved.
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(3)   Triggers for certain measures must be determined. The network partners 
shall agree to a common early warning system and determine which 
measures should be taken and how upon reaching the limit values.
(4)   To this end, decision and implementation processes in the event of crisis 
have to be formulated in advance and defined obligingly. Thereby, the 
‘normal case’ (for example an isolated crisis at a smaller bank) should 
be distinguished from an acute or threatening system crisis (for example 
in a ‘too-big-to-fail’ case, or a number of financial institutions with 
critical symptoms and the danger of contagion over the entire financial 
intermediation system).
Lessons from the financial crisis
•    The swiftness of state intervention is crucial for containment of the negative externals 
of a financial system crisis. Hesitant intervention reduces the effect of the measures 
and results in higher costs for overcoming the crisis.
•   Crisis-indicating triggers, as well as decision and implementation processes derived 
thereof, must be defined and specified ex-ante in the course of OBA or CBR measures 
in order to prevent discussions between the involved network partners and political 
influence in the event of crisis.
•   Predefined measures must not result in an increased morally hazardous conduct on 
part of the insured financial institution’s management. To this end it is helpful for 
the supervising authority and deposit insurance institution to clearly communicate 
their intention of imposing OBA measures quickly on threatened institutions or to 
shut them down in order to replace management, as well as to hold the responsible 
individuals of the insured institutions legally accountable.
3.3.9 Payout  mechanism
Pursuant to legal provisions, the deposit insurance fund arranges for a quick 
and efficient payout of covered deposits in the event of loss. The attributes 
‘quickly’ and ‘efficiently’ are the characteristics of this design element.
•   Time aspect: The period in which a deposit insurance institution is able 
to make covered deposits available to investors is an essential element 
of ensuring the credibility of the protection system. Therefore, this time 
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the benchmark aiming for a period of one or two business days
81. The new 
EU Directive 2009/14/EC assumes 20 days
82. Other European countries use 
time periods of more than a week as a target.
•   Efficiency  aspect: A payout mechanism is considered efficient if it supports 
the goal of system resilience while involving the lowest costs possible 
for transacting the payout. Generally, there are two payout models for 
discussion: Direct payout through the deposit insurance fund or making the 
liquidity required to payout covered deposits available to the illiquid bank 
and transacting the payout through this bank (for example in the course of 
bridge bank transactions). Experience shows, that the latter is preferred as it 
is more cost-efficient while simultaneously reducing the risk of depositors 
effectively transacting withdrawals (i.e., by extending the period in which 
such withdrawals occur).
3.3.10  Claims and recovery
Directly connected to the payout mechanism the question arises of whether 
and to what extent the deposit insurance fund obtains receivables from the 
insolvent bank as a consequence of bridged payments to depositors. Here, 
two alternative solutions are for discussion: Pure insurance approach and 
succession approach:
•   Insurance: The deposit insurance fund is conceptualized as an insurance 
only. Similar to an indemnity insurance it accrues reserves used for 
covering incurred losses. The right of recourse against the insolvent bank 
is excluded. In this model, the LGD turns out to be significantly higher
83 
of course, since the deposit insurance does not receive any financial means 
from the insolvent financial institution in the course of the mostly tedious 
liquidation process. The expected loss and the required coverage premium 
are proportionately higher.
81  Refer to Annual Performance Plan 2009, Insurance Program available at http://www.fdic.gov/
about/strategic/performance/2009/insurance.html.
82 The payout delay of three months currently provided for shall be reduced to a period of 20 
working days. By March 2011, the Commission should submit to the European Parliament and to 
the Council a report on the effectiveness and delays of the payout procedures assessing whether 
a further reduction of the delay to 10 working days would be appropriate.
83 I.e. the recovery rate (rr) is lower which leads to a higher LGD since the latter is defined as 
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•   Succession: In this model the deposit insurance institution assumes the 
depositor’s position to the extent of the payouts. This way it only provides 
an anticipatory credit for the payout of covered deposits and aims to add 
the transacted payments from the liquidation proceeds to the fund in part 
or as a whole. It is obvious that the premiums to be paid by the insured 
institutions turn out significantly lower in this model than in the insurance 
model.
Combinations of the two models are, of course, conceivable. Each model 
has its advantages and disadvantages. The insurance model strengthens the 
position of other creditor claims not covered by deposit insurance (in particular 
the protected but not covered amount of deposits
84). This reduces the risk of 
untimely liquidity outflows. On the other hand, deposit protection designed 
in this way requires a high volume of target capital and credible reinsurance 
from the state or the Central Bank. The succession model requires low target 
capital volume and lower premiums, but it weakens the non-secured depositor 
claims in case of bankruptcy and it entails cash maintenance costs for the 
insured institution because of mostly strict provision regarding liquidity and 
account balancing structure.
3.3.11  Reinsurance and additional warranties
Design and architecture of the deposit insurance systems aim at the ‘normal 
case’, i.e., coverage of failures at small institutes or a few medium size failure 
within mostly long time periods. If a failure of a big banking house or several 
thereof occurs, or if cumulative insolvencies of smaller and mid-size banks 
take place, then the capacity of even a generously designed insurance fund 
will be exhausted or overwhelmed very quickly. Even if the deposit insurance 
fund is just sufficient at best, thereafter, it is hardly capable of operating and 
appearing credible for years as a consequence.
Therefore, every deposit insurance system requires additional state warranties 
in terms of reinsurance. Such warranties should be of explicit nature. This is 
the only way they can reach the desired effect of increasing the credibility of 
deposit insurance and account for the warranties in terms of premiums at the 
expense of the warranty recipient. It is indisputable that dangerous morally 
84 I.e. the depositors are separately compensated and do not have to be disbursed by ‘liquidated 
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hazardous effects emanate from unrestricted reinsurance commitments of 
the state. In addition, the question arises as to whether the state would be 
able to fulfill adequate warranty commitments in the event of crisis. Since 
such commitments have to be associated with a strict and efficient regime of 
insolvency and resolution, the path towards nationalization always remains 
an option, which will also prevent a bank-run in most cases (at least in the 
European states)
85.
The following aspects are of particular importance in connection with such 
reinsurance commitments of the state:
(1)   Guarantor: Only the state itself or its Central Bank represents a credible 
guarantor. Solutions with private insurance or reinsurance companies, as 
discussed in the literature as well, have hardly proven to be realistic
86. 
At best, a market solution would be conceivable in terms of securitizing 
failure risks which in turn would be afflicted by other problems
87.
(2)   Terms of warranty: State reinsurance may include an unrestricted 
or restricted commitment. It can be claimed either when the deposit 
insurance fund has been exhausted or in case of certain events. It may be 
formulated as an anticipatory credit or refundable warranty payment.
(3)   Warranty-triggering events: The claim to reinsurance has to be associated 
with clearly predefined situations or events. Such events could be 
foreseeable insolvency of the fund or achievement of the minimal 
threshold value of fund assets. But it is also possible to determine the 
failure of certain financial institutions as the triggering factor ex-ante, 
for example by transacting deposit payouts in case of certain financial 
institutions relevant for the system (in general or starting with a certain 
threshold value) directly through the reinsurance of the state instead 
of the deposit insurance. In that case, reinsurance ensures continuous 
functionality and credibility of the deposit insurance fund, which can be 
of importance when a system crisis is looming. The deposit insurance 
85  It is a completely different matter in countries where the state itself has low credibility regarding 
its ability and intention to fulfill warranty commitments.
86 E.g. the FDIC engaged Marsh & McLennan to evaluate the feasibility of private sector 
reinsurance arrangements. The study found that reinsurers had only limited interest in engaging 
in reinsurance agreements with the FDIC on terms acceptable to the Corporation. Further extracts 
can be found in FDIC (2007).
87 This would be, for instance, a question of volume for securitization, capital management, 
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institution should be the triggering entity for claiming the reinsurance 
commitment for each case.
(4)   Restricted or unrestricted warranty: The restriction of state reinsurance 
commitments reduces the state’s risk without excluding that unrestricted 
commitments must be made in the event of a system crisis. Since in 
the latest financial crises a great number of states have entered into 
unrestricted warranty commitments, market participants will presume the 
same in case of future crises of similar extent. It is therefore recommended 
to make unrestricted warranty commitments under conditions specified in 
detail from the outset. In particular, a clearly specified Failure Resolution 
Regime including clearly specified OBA and CBR should be part of 
this framework, respectively measures, explicit intention and the legal 
competence to nationalize financial institutions threatened by failure 
and relevant for the system, as well as the explicit commitment to hold 
decision-making staff at the problematic institutes legally accountable.
(5)   Anticipatory credit or warranty payment: In case of anticipatory credit of 
payments out of the reinsurance, it is assumed that the state payments will 
be restored in the course of the deposit insurance system. The required 
capital to this end usually arises from the liquidation proceeds from the 
insolvency process. In case of warranty payments, the guarantor shall 
waive the refund in part or completely since the insolvent institute will 
likely always be nationalized in case of claiming a warranty.
(6)   Payout mechanism: Payouts from the reinsurance commitment will 
always be transacted by the deposit insurance institution (just as 
outstanding refunds in favor of the guarantor).
(7)   Compensation: Explicit reinsurance commitments have to be compensated 
risk-adequately, in favor of the guarantor. Appropriate premiums can 
either be included in the total premium of an institute relevant to the 
system or charged separately. In each case, the collection of the premium 
should be transacted together with the normal deposit insurance premium. 
Whether the state deposit insurance fund reimburses the state for the 
collected reinsurance premium or retains it to strengthen the capital basis 
and itemizes it as a guarantor’s claim on the balance sheet depends on the 
concrete design of the reinsurance mechanism.70 Deposit insurance architecture
Lessons from the financial crisis
•   Every deposit insurance institution disposes of explicit or implicit reinsurance 
commitment of the state. In many cases the implicit warranty commitment has been 
transformed to an explicit commitment in the course of the crisis’ accentuation.
•   In order to reduce morally hazardous commitments, warranties should be made 
explicit in advance and compensated risk-adequately.
•   Reinsurance commitments of the state should be accompanied by clearly defined 
Failure Resolutions Regimes and OBA or CBR measures.
•   Reinsurance commitments by the state should be accompanied by the clearly 
communicated intention to nationalize a bank relevant to the system quickly. The 
agency should be held responsible for the insolvency and decision-makers legally 
accountable.
3.3.12  Cooperation and coordination
The importance of close cooperation between the institutions responsible for 
the resilience of the financial system for efficient deposit insurance has already 
been addressed several times. The experience of the recent financial crisis 
confirms that financial market supervision, deposit insurance and the Central 
Bank can inspire confidence in the market participants necessary for containing 
a crisis only by cooperating and making well founded joint decisions.
Cooperation and coordination with the other elements of the financial safety 
network of a financial intermediation system are important for effective 
deposit insurance. The financial crisis has shown that there are other 
interfacing areas aside from supervision and regulation, e.g. the government 
or the state. In addition, there is always a cross-border demand for cooperation 
and adjustment as a consequence of internationalization and globalization of 
the financial sector.
•   Interface to the financial market authority: The most important interface for 
deposit insurance institutions is undoubtedly with the financial market authority. 
Unlike the American FDIC for instance, no supervision functions (or only minimal 
functions) have been transferred to the European deposit insurance institutions. 
Determining the risk exposure of a financial institutions or the financial system 
as a whole and timely intervening is the task of the financial market authority and 
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market authority also decides about implementing support and redevelopment 
measures and demands financial means from the deposit insurance fund for 
financing OBA measures. Usually, the decision to release indemnity payments to 
the insured depositors is made by the authority as well.
•   Interface with the Central Bank: There is usually a direct point of 
intersection with the Central Bank if this reinsurance function or the 
financing function for the deposit protection fund has been transferred. 
The Central Bank will mostly be involved in OBA or CBR measures (and 
certainly in solving problems of banks relevant to the system) along with 
the deposit insurance institution in most cases.
•    Interface with the government: Experience of the recent financial crisis shows 
that the state very quickly gets involved in the event of a spreading financial 
system crisis. Careful adjustment of state warranty commitments to the deposit 
insurance system is a requirement for preventing morally hazardous conduct of 
the market participants in the future. This particularly includes early discussion 
and decision on future measures of suspending or gradually reducing state 
warranty commitments. If state commitments are extended in case of crisis, 
regulation and supervision should be enhanced at the same time
88.
As said before, coordination and cooperation require a careful definition of 
the decision and action process, not only within individual elements of the 
financial security network but also across the network as a whole. It is equally 
important to establish an institutionalized, formalized and quick exchange of 
information between the network elements.
Lessons from the financial crisis
•    In the event of crisis there is intense communication and cooperation between the deposit 
insurance institution and the financial market authority as well as the Central Bank.
•   This close cooperation and coordination between the main elements of the financial 
safety network in terms of taking action and decision-making is a requirement for the 
efficiency of the deposit insurance system.
•   In this regard, information exchange as well as decision and action processes must 
be defined and formalized for the entire network in advance.
•   Additional state warranty commitments have to be accompanied by increased 
regulation in order to prevent morally hazardous conduct of market participants.
88  See also Schich (2009).72
4  International harmonization and coordination
4.1  Legal initial position 
The decision to design and implement a deposit insurance system has 
primarily been a national issue for a long time. Pursuant to the Investment 
Services Directive adopted in 1993
89, which refers to the harmonization 
of many areas of financial market supervision, the Directive 94/19/EU on 
deposit insurance for the first time defines general conditions for adjusting 
deposit insurance systems in the EU member states. Thereby all member 
states were indeed obliged to implement deposit insurance systems, their 
appropriate design however was left to individual countries.
The events of the financial crisis in 2007 and particularly in the fall of 
2008 revealed weak spots in many European deposit insurance systems. 
It particularly became apparent that their most important goal of ensuring 
resilience of the banks and the financial system by inspiring confidence of 
the depositors in the protection of their insured deposits was not achieved at 
all or only in part. As a consequence, Directive 94/19/EU was revised and 
adopted by the European Parliament in March 2009 as Directive 2009/14/
EU. The minimal coverage sum, the decision-making period about a crisis 
of an insured institution, the payment period for covered deposits as well as 
prohibition of damage shares for investors (co-insurance) still prescribed by 
many deposit insurance systems have been adjusted or changed. The 2009 
Directive concretely defines general conditions for important design elements 
of deposit insurance systems obligatorily applicable in 27 EU-member states.
These changes can be seen as a consequence of reactions from different 
member states governments to the events in the fall 2008. The Commission 
also recognized that further international harmonization of deposit insurance 
systems will be required as a consequence of the experiences made in the 
financial crisis. Hence, in the spring of 2009, the EU Commission submitted 
89  Directive 93/22/EEC. The ISD established the conditions in which authorized investment firms 
and banks could provide specified services in other EU on the basis of home state authorization 
and supervision and also contained the right of direct or remote access of any authorized ISD firm 
to participate in trading on exchanges or regulated markets in other member states. The ISD has 
now been revised by the Markets in financial instruments directive (MiFID).73 International harmonization and coordination
a consultative document in which it asked the member states for their opinion 
on a total of forty key questions
90. Based on their opinions the Directive 
94/19/EU should probably be fundamentally revised even more in the 
medium term.
4.2  The importance of international harmonization
Differing standards and regulations of national deposit insurance systems 
may lead to a regulatory arbitrage of the depositor. Informed investors 
transfer deposits to countries with better deposit insurance (for example by 
using foreign branches of their domestic banks) or financial institutions use 
another country’s better protection for acquiring deposits and then transfer 
them across the border within the international corporation
91. Depositors less 
well informed or internationally less flexible can be placed at a disadvantage. 
Governments may be tempted to give their domestic banks and financial 
intermediaries a cutting edge by enforcing looser general conditions (for 
example for financing deposit insurance).
Therefore, internationally harmonizing the architecture of national deposit 
insurance systems definitely makes sense. This does not, by any means, 
exclude that the characteristics of individual building blocks consider 
country-specific circumstances and general conditions.
4.3 Cross-border  cooperation
The growing internationalism of retail banking forces the national deposit 
insurance institutions to cooperate more closely across borders. Two problem 
areas take center stage: Cooperation in the course of topping-up arrangements 
and insolvencies of internationally operating financial institutions.
•   Topping-up arrangements: Generally, the deposit insurance system of the 
country in which a financial institution has its headquarters is responsible 
for the investors’ indemnity in the event of loss even if it placed its deposits 
90  European Commission (2009). The answer of EFDI as of July 2009 can be found under http://
www.efdi.net/scarica.asp?id=107 &Types=NEWS.
91 Thus Icelandic banks booked more than 300 million Euro in deposits at German branches in 
2008 alone, although the entire Icelandic investment protection systems guaranteed a coverage of 
only approx. 105 million Euro. Similarly high volumes of investments were accepted in Dutch 
and British branches.74 International harmonization and coordination
with a foreign branch of the parent company. However, if it is a legally 
independent subsidiary company of the insolvent institute, then the deposit 
insurance system of the country where the subsidiary company has its 
headquarters is obliged to cover the required payments. If the coverage sum 
for the appropriate deposits is higher in the host country of the subsidiary 
than in the home country, then the deposit insurance system of the host 
country has to cover the difference between the (lower) coverage sum of the 
home country and the (higher) coverage sum of the host country. In other 
words, topping-up arrangements consist in supplementing (‘topping-up’) 
a lower home country guarantee up to the wider cover offered in the 
host country. Such a differentiated deposit insurance coverage between 
individual countries is problematic in many respects. It makes it more 
difficult to calculate risk-adjusted amounts for the insured institutions. It 
results in unfair competition and thus interferes with smooth operation of the 
financial services market across borders. It complicates quick and efficient 
deposit payout and confuses investors who suddenly have to struggle with 
several different deposit insurance systems in different countries. Not to 
mention, it impedes with efficient redevelopment and liquidation of an 
illiquid or insolvent financial institution with an international structure of 
organization because of the mostly differing regulatory conditions in the 
countries in question
92.
•   Insolvency of international financial institutions: The liquidation of the 
international branches or subsidiaries of the Icelandic Kaupthing bank 
for example shows that missing harmonization of deposit insurance and 
insolvency regulations may lead to high costs in the affected countries. 
Rescue operations of banks with an international organizational structure are 
facilitated by harmonizing and standardizing deposit insurance regulations. 
The appropriate processes and structures have to be defined and adjusted 
before a crisis - we have learnt from experience that there is no time left 
once the crisis has arrived. In connection to this, the suggestion that only 
a single deposit insurance system, for example that in the investor’s country 
of residence, shall take responsibility for all demands including deposit 
insurance systems in other countries, makes sense.
92 For further discussion on topping-up as well as on possible options for the future refer to 
Cariboni et al. (2008).75 International harmonization and coordination
4.3.1  Creation of a pan-European deposit insurance system?
If international harmonization, coordination and cooperation are requirements 
for an efficient national deposit insurance system, then the question arises as 
to whether a unique or pan-European deposit insurance system for all EU 
member states would be the right solution.
The experience of the recent financial crisis shows that internationally 
operating banks have to be influenced by internationally coordinated or 
even independent international regulation and supervision in their business 
conduct. Following through on this thought we arrive at the conclusion that 
only a central supervising authority can decide whether an internationally 
operating financial institution is approaching illiquidity or insolvency, or 
whether it has reached this state already.
The catalogue of questions submitted for consultation by the EU Commission 
correctly declares that there are hardly any incentives for national supervising 
authorities in the currently fragmented national deposit insurance system to 
give thought to the question as to how to arrive at an optimal solution for all 
affected depositors in many different countries if an internationally operating 
bank runs into difficulties
93. Every country will try to optimize its own 
advantage.
The creation of a pan-European deposit insurance system comes not only 
with a series of fundamental advantages but also disadvantages that should be 
carefully evaluated. The following advantages can be adduced:
•   Improved credibility: A deposit insurance system at the level of the 
European Union with only one contact partner inspires credibility even in 
those investors who transferred their deposit at foreign branches of their 
financial institution.
•   International  solidarity: The creation of a unique deposit insurance system 
results in increased international solidarity in the event of crisis and 
stays abreast the cross-border integration of financial institutions in the 
interbanking sector, for instance.
93  “Since banking supervisors are involved in the decision whether a bank should be saved or the 
DGS be triggered, the fragmentation of DGS does not provide incentives for supervisors to reach 
a solution that is in the interest of all depositors and takes into account the potential impact on the 
financial stability of all Member States concerned”. See European Commission (2009).76 International harmonization and coordination
•    Simplified failure resolution: The greatest advantage of all is certainly that 
it becomes possible to conduct cross-border procedures of insolvency and 
resolution, including OBA and CBR measures, more efficiently and cost-
effectively.
•   Simplified payouts: It is possible to simplify and accelerate payouts 
by financial institutions with a network of international branches and 
subsidiaries in the course of insolvency proceedings.
•   Broader fund-base: The more insured institutions, the broader the fund-
base. A fund-size in pan-European dimension might be in the position to 
flatten abrupt liquidity fluctuations while avoiding payout problems.
•    Simplified premium payments: A supranational deposit insurance fund may 
not eliminate but significantly reduce problems of calculating risk-adequate 
premiums for internally operating financial organizations.
•   Reduction of adverse selection/moral hazard: After all, a pan-European 
deposit insurance system may avoid regulatory arbitrage related to different 
national deposit insurance systems.
In sum all these positive aspects imply that a supranational deposit insurance 
system can inspire confidence in international investors who operate across 
borders and hence reduce the risks of a bank run affecting several countries. 
Thus, the deposit insurance system promotes resilience. However, these 
advantages contrast with important disadvantages:
•   International supervising authorities as a requirement: A requirement for 
a pan-European deposit insurance system is the creation of appropriate 
supranational regulation and supervision of the financial institutions 
associated with this deposit insurance. The creation of a cross-border 
deposit insurance scheme is inconceivable before such an international 
supervising institution, as well as supranational conditions of regulation 
have been implemented.
•   Political obstacles: The suggestion of a pan-European deposit insurance 
system may include a number of strong points and it may certainly solve 
some of the problems in connection with deposit insurance of internationally 
operating financial institutions still unresolved today. However, the 
political country specific problems related to this are massive. For this 77 International harmonization and coordination
reason the chances of success for this project are probably not too high in 
the foreseeable future.
•   Fund management/investment policy: Fundamental problems also exist in 
connection with managing a large pan-European deposit insurance fund. 
The investment of the fund capital would present the authorities responsible 
for this with a great challenge.
•   Administrative and operative complexity: The more insured institutions 
have to be subsumed under one fund organization the higher the 
administrative cost (i.e. IT, premium calculation, control mechanism). An 
immense steering and implementation intricacy might further challenge 
cost-benefit considerations.
The evaluation of advantages and disadvantages of such a cross-border 
solution shows that this goal has to be pursued despite foreseeable difficulties. 
That seems to be also the declared intention of the European Union
94.
4.3.2 Architectural  options
Following the considerations of the EU Commission
95, at least three different 
options for designing a pan-European deposit insurance system in the future 
should be discussed:
(1)   Centralization of the national deposit insurance systems into a pan-
European system: This solution dissolves the individual national deposit 
insurance systems or rather integrates them into a supranational deposit 
insurance organization. The pan-European deposit insurance system 
assumes the previous functions of the national protection systems.
(2)   Supplementary pan-European deposit protection: The national deposit 




95  See footnote above. 
96  The EC mentions in this context a so called ‘28
th regime’ complementary to the existing solution 
in the 27 member countries. See European Commission (2009).78 International harmonization and coordination
(3)   Establishment of a deposit insurance network: Finally, a pan-European 
solution can be achieved by establishing a network of national deposit 
insurance institutions, which creates solidarity based on appropriate 
formal coordination, unique architecture and specifications of fundamental 
design elements, as well as extensive cooperation agreements.
4.3.3 Memberships
An important question of conceptualizing supranational deposit insurance is 
that of membership. Should all banks become members of this organization? 
Or only those who operate internationally? Or only those financial institutions 
that operate internationally on the one hand but are relevant to the national 
or international system on the other hand? The answer to this question also 
depends on the selected system architecture. It is different for the two options 
mentioned in the previous section. Of course all financial institutions with 
eligible deposits will have to become member in creating a unique pan-
European deposit insurance scheme replacing the current national solutions. 
If an additional supranational institution is established, then it can be designed 
as a reinsurance for the national systems, which would imply a membership 
of the these that pay appropriate premiums into the international deposit 
insurance fund. A direct membership of system-relevant financial institutions 
in individual countries is also conceivable for this solution since it must 
be assumed that the excessive demand on the national systems (and hence 
a claim on the supranational system) has been triggered by these insured 
institutions in all probability.
Lessons from the financial crisis
•    National deposit insurance systems will be overstressed in many European countries 
in the case of a system crisis.
•   The more international the financial services sector becomes, the sooner an 
insolvency of a financial institution will affect the deposit insurance system of 
several countries.
•   The growing internationalism of the deposit insurance business demands cross-
border structures as well as cross-border solidarity.79
5  Some Policy implications
The analysis of the current theoretical and empirical results of research on 
the various effects of a deposit insurance system, as well as the experiences 
from the recent financial crisis, arrives at the following key conclusions, 
which could be helpful to political institutions dealing with adjustment, 
authorization, and implementation of modern deposit insurance:
(1)   Deposit insurance primarily aims at improving and ensuring the resilience 
of the financial system. Considerations of costs and benefits should be 
made under these aspects.
(2)   The aforesaid unrestricted warranties of many states in 2008 have strongly 
influenced depositors’ expectations for future financial crises. The danger 
of morally hazardous conduct is significantly higher than before the 
crisis. Appropriate tightening of the regulatory conditions has to act as 
a counterbalance to the enhanced state protection commitment.
(3)    The deposit insurance institution is not simply a ‘pay box’ for paying out 
jeopardized deposits, but rather an integrated part of a comprehensive 
safety network for stabilizing the financial system. Its role and 
competencies in case of a financial crisis should be defined clearly in 
advance and delimited from the functions of other security network 
elements.
(4)   Governance of a deposit insurance system should be organized not only 
by including the insured sector but also by minimizing the risks of 
‘regulatory capture’ and exerting political influence.
(5)   The  eligible deposit base shall include short-term deposits (i.e. outstanding 
debts to customers with a short duration of a maximum of three months) 
which potentially lead to grave liquidity problem in case of immediate 
withdrawal.
(6)   Insured depositors shall not only be private but also business customers 
which also can be subject to ‘bank-runs’.80 Some Policy implications
(7)   An adequate and aim-matching deposit insurance scheme is financed on 
an ex-ante basis with obligatory membership on national or pan-European 
level.
(8)    The deposit insurance organization has to ensure that the fund’s assets are 
invested on a risk-free basis and can be rapidly liquidated.
(9)    The fund needs to be equipped with a minimal coverage capital from the 
start which can either be directly at disposal or guaranteed.
(10)   In case of payout decision, covered deposits shall be disbursed within 
few working days.
(11)   The appropriate premium calculation models have to be simplified 
and designed risk-based while including institution-specific as well as 
systemic risk components. 
(12)   System-relevant banks always have an implicit state warranty. It is 
better to transform implicit into explicit warranty. 
(13)   Design and architecture of deposit insurance systems should support 
cross-border harmonization and cooperation.
These conclusions are in line with the recommendations that the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision submitted together with IADI in the 
spring of 2009
97. They also support and supplement considerations made in 
the course of revising the EU Directive 94/19/EU as well as its preliminary 
amendment in the spring of 2009.
97 BCBS/IADI  (2009).81
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